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The BP B1 Bundle  Ruling: Federal Statutory 
Displacement of General Maritime Law 
 
      
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States…. 1 
 
 
John J. Costonis2   
          6/30/13 
© 3/12/2013 
 
 The latitude accorded federal judges to fashion law has engaged commentators at 
least since Judge Henry Friendly’s endorsement of the “new federal common law.”3 The 
issue can be viewed vertically on the basis of the federalism issues resulting from the 
tension between incompatible federal and state substantive law. This essay borrows from 
the commentary’s familiar distinction between decisions fashioning federal law and those 
merely filling in a federal statute’s interstitial gaps. Unlike an Erie-centered framework, 
however, the essay stresses the horizontal axis by examining tensions between federal 
statutes and federal judge-made law, which bring separation of powers values to the fore.   
 
The federal/state preemption inquiry4 targets conflicts between the competing 
federal/state norms that threaten federal supremacy clause values. Outright conflict 
foretells federal common law displacement by statute as well. But incompatibility between 
competing norms in the displacement arena is more nuanced because separation of powers 
values impose greater constraints on the judiciary’s role. Hence, the “same sort of evidence 
of a clear and manifest purpose [of Congress’s intent to displace] is not required,” the 
United States Supreme Court has stated.5 In displacement disputes judges start with the 
assumption “that it is for Congress, not federal courts to articulate the appropriate 
standards to be applied as a matter of federal law.”6  
 




1 U.S. Const. art. 1, sec. 1.  
2 Chancellor-Emeritus and Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. Professor Costonis is not 
a consultant to or affiliated with any party engaged in the BP MDL proceedings discussed in this essay. The 
author thanks his colleagues, Professor Devlin and Williams for their comments on earlier drafts of the 
article. The author also thanks the LSU Law Center for summer research grant support for this essay. 
3 Judge Henry Friendly, In Praise of Erie –And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383 (1964). 
4 Although often used interchangeably in the literature as well as in various of this essay’s quotations, the 
terms “displacement” and “preemption” are accurately understood as referring, respectively, to supersession 
of federal common or maritime law by federal statute pursuant to the principles described in this essay’s Part 
II, and supersession of a state legal norm by a federal norm in consequence of the (federal) Supremacy Clause. 
5 Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981) (hereinafter Milwaukee II). 
6 Id.  
 2 
The Court asks instead whether the judiciary has concurrently treated in a different 
manner the same issue addressed by Congress in what, in fact, is a competition opposing 
the respective lawmaking authority of the two branches. The judge-made rule risks  
displacement if it incompatibly addresses the same “question,” or occupies the same 
“space” as the federal statute.7  This standard safeguards the priority as lawmaker granted 
Congress by the constitution. “Cases recognizing that the comprehensive character of a 
federal program is an insufficient basis to find pre-emption of state law are not in point [in 
displacement disputes],” the Court has observed in its leading displacement opinion, “since 
we are considering which branch of the Federal Government is the source of federal law, not 
whether that law pre-empts state law.”8  
 
The Court has cautioned lower federal court judges that “[a]lthough … there is a 
significant body of federal law fashioned by the federal judiciary in the common-law 
tradition, … federal courts, unlike their state counterparts, are courts of limited jurisdiction 
that have not been vested with open-ended lawmaking powers.”9 Its “commitment to the 
separation of powers is too fundamental to continue to rely on federal common law … 
when Congress has addressed the problem.”10 The federal common law’s general maritime 
law sector enjoys somewhat greater latitude,11 but the Court’s respect for congressional 
primacy remains firm. “Even in admiralty… where the federal judiciary's lawmaking power 
may well be at its strongest, it is our duty to respect the will of Congress.”12 The Court’s 
privileging of federal statutes over maritime law is engraved in its iconic declaration in East 
River Steamship Corporation v. Transamerica Delaval, Incorporated (Delaval) that “[a]bsent 
a relevant statute, the general maritime law, as developed by the judiciary, applies.”13 
 
Adjudicating displacement disputes places the Court squarely, if uneasily, between 
Congress and the lower federal courts.14 Despite its commitment to Congress’s primacy as 
lawmaker, the Court is alert to the judiciary’s common lawmaking powers, particularly as 
the admiralty clause amplifies them in the maritime sphere.  
 
Two different questions arise depending upon whether or not Congress has adopted 
a statute that overlaps the pertinent judge-made rule, which usually appears as a maritime 
                                                        
7 Accord:  United States v. Steuart Trans. Co., 596 F;2d 609, 617 (4th Cir. 1979) (Canons favoring  preservation 
of “established precepts of maritime law ... cannot prevail when Congress enacts a specific remedy that is 
contrary to judicially created remedies for the same wrong”). See TAN Part II(B) infra. 
8 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 319, n. 14 (emphasis added). 
9 Northwest Airlines Incorporated v. Transport Workers, Union of America, 451 U.S. 77, 94 (1981).  
10  Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 315.   
11 Cf. United States v. Oswego Barge Co., 664 F.2d 327, 336 (2d Cir. 1981)(“[T]he Supreme Court appears to 
have applied the presumption of statutory preemption somewhat less forcefully to judge-made maritime law 
than to non-maritime federal common law”)  (Newman J.).   
12 Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 96.  Accord, Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990) ( “Maritime 
tort law is now dominated by federal statute, and we are not free to expand remedies at will ….. ).  
13 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986) (emphasis added).  
14 Justice Blackmun has framed the challenge thusly: “Inevitably, a federal court must acknowledge the 
tension between its obligation to apply the federal common law in implementing an important federal 
interest, and its need to exercise judicial self restraint and defer to the will of Congress. Milwaukee II, 541 U.S. 
at 339, n. 8 (Blackmun J., dissenting). 
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cause of action or one of the latter’s substantive or procedural components. Absent a 
statute, the Court confines its inquiry to whether the matter engages admiralty jurisdiction 
at all. If a tort, the Court’s view under a line of authority commencing with Executive Jet 
Aviation Company v. City of Cleveland15 requires, among other elements, that the event 
feature a vessel on the nation’s navigable waters pursuing a function that bears a 
“substantial relationship to a traditional maritime activity.”16  
 
If a federal statute overlaps judicial lawmaking, the focus shifts to the relationship 
between the two lawmaking exercises. The present essay features this shift in probing 
whether and to what extent the general maritime law oil pollution tort survives 
displacement by two federal statutes: the Oil Pollution Act of 199017 (OPA) and the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act18 (OCSLA). 
 
 Displacement disputes also divide between those in which the general maritime 
lawmaking exercise precedes or follows the statute’s adoption.19 The BP dispute illustrates 
the former because the maritime pollution tort preceded OPA and OCSLA. Federal courts 
engage as directly in lawmaking when they conclude that a prior maritime rule survives a 
                                                        
15 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972). 
16 Id. at 268.  Executive Jet is discussed further in TAN145-48  infra. In earlier articles, the author has 
questioned whether admiralty jurisdiction appropriately attaches to the BP blowout and spill at all in light, 
inter alia, of OCS petroleum development operation’s dubious status as a “traditional maritime activity.” See 
John J. Costonis, The Macondo Well Blowout: Taking the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Seriously, 42 J. 
Mar. L. & Com. 511, 5212-24 (2011) [hereinafter Costonis I]; J. Costonis, And Not a Drop to Drink: Admiralty 
Law and the BP Well Blowout, 73 La. L. Rev. 1, 2-5, 15-18 ((2012) [hereinafter Costonis II]. 
17 Pub. L. No.101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (2006) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. secs. 2701-2761 (2006 & Supp. 
III 2009).  
18 Ch. 345, 67 stat. 462 (1953), (codified as amended at 434 U.S.C. 1331-1356(a) (2006) & Supp. II 2009 
[hereinafter OCSLA]. Despite this essay’s focus on OPA, OCSLA is hardly a bit player. The BP blowout featured 
the discharge of an estimated 4.9 million barrels of OCS-sourced oil. See Deepwater: The Gulf Oil Disaster and 
the Future of Offshore Drilling 167 (National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 
Drilling 2011) [hereinafter President’s Report]. The Deepwater Horizon contributed no more than 17,000 
barrels at best of its own stored diesel oil, id. at p. 130, an infinitesimal three/ten thousandths of the BP well 
discharge. OCSLA, which Congress adopted under the Property and Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses, 
secures the federal government’s sovereignty, control and regulatory powers over the OCS and its resources. 
See Costonis I, supra note 15, at 526-34. OCSLA also characterizes the OCS as an exclusive federal enclave, and 
specifies in sec. 1333(a)(1) of its 1953 version that non-admiralty law governs activity occurring on 
permanently attached drilling facilities. Id. at 530-34. The provision was revised in 1978 to add “temporarily 
attached” facilities (including Deepwater Horizon-type Mobile Offshore Drilling Units or MODUs), thereby 
calling into question MODUs’ status as admiralty jurisdiction-creating “vessels.” Id. at 545-49; Costonis II, 
supra note 15 at pp. 20-30. More problematic still is B1 Bundle’s claim, B1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 949-
950, that the OCS drilling operations are “substantially related to a traditional maritime activity.” See id. at 
15-20; see TAN 137-44 & n. 144. According to the OCSLA legislative conference report, the amendment, 
premised on Congress’s power under the property clause, also introduced a “new statutory regime for the 
management of oil and natural gas resources of the OCS,” Costonis I, supra note 16, at 541, quoting H.R. Rep. 
No. 95-590, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N 1450, 1461, approving environmental goals and a 
private OCS oil pollution liability regime, subsequently revised and folded into OPA’s single federal pollution 
regime.  
19 See United States v. Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 337 (2d. Cir. 1981) (‘”[P]reemption of maritime law 
has occurred both as to prior judge-made law and the authority [of federal judges] to fashion new law”) 
(Newman J.).   
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subsequent statute’s enactment as when they initially formulated the rule in the absence of 
the statute.20 Whether or not their conclusion properly aligns with separation of powers 
considerations frames the issue for the Supreme Court.    
 
Mobil Oil Corporation v. Higginbotham21 exemplifies the second pattern --prior 
federal statute/subsequent maritime rule. The judicial incorporation of a damages 
component --loss of society-- in a general maritime law wrongful death action failed, the 
Court held, to respect the command of the prior Death on the High Seas Act22 (DHOSA) that 
“spoke directly”23 to the same issue by referencing “pecuniary” damages. 
 
Displacement is addressed in this essay through the prism of the B1 Bundle Master 
Complaint Order and Ruling24 (B1 Bundle), issued by Louisiana’s Eastern Federal District 
Court in the seminal opening phase of the BP Multi-District Litigation (MDL). At the heart of 
the ruling is the court’s allocation of the roles of general maritime tort law and OPA in 
governing the claims of over 100,000 private plaintiffs for economic and property losses 
resulting from the discharge of an estimated 4.9 million barrels of oil from BP’s Outer 
Continental Shelf (OCS) facility, the Macondo Well. Included as defendants alongside BP, 
the Macondo lessee, and Transocean, owner of the Deepwater Horizon Mobile Offshore 
Drilling Unit, are Halliburton (participant in the cementing of the Macondo well) and 
Cameron (source of the operations’ blow-out preventer) as well as a variety of other 
parties.25 BP and Transocean were cited both as OPA section 2702(a) “Responsible Parties” 
and, along with other defendants, as tortfeasors liable for the oil discharges under maritime 
negligence law.   
 
B1 Bundle ruled that general maritime substantive law and, with a minor exception, 
maritime procedural law survived OPA’s enactment unscathed.26 This holding conflicts 
with two mutually supportive rationales that call for displacement instead. The first 
focuses on conflicts between maritime law and specific OPA provisions that are sufficient 
                                                        
20 Delavan’s statement that “[a]bsent a relevant statute, the general maritime law, as developed by the 
judiciary, applies”evidences that without OPA and OCSLA, admiralty jurisdiction, and hence admiralty 
substantive law, would govern the B-1Bundle maritime tort unhindered, assuming that the latter satisfies 
and its progeny. The presence of such statutes, on the other hand, modifies the equation in disputes in which 
the general maritime rule precedes or follows them. B1 Bundle’s conclusion that OPA fails to displace the 
maritime tort is no less an exercise in maritime rulemaking than the federal judiciary’s initial establishment 
of oil pollution as a maritime tort. The second ruling further defines and specifies the proper range of the 
maritime principle, this time with the “relevant statute[s]”  –OPA and OCSLA-- in place.  
21 436 U.S. 618 (2010). 
22 Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.A. 30303 (2011)(hereinafter DHOSA). 
23 Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 625.  
24 In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943 
(E.D. La. 2011) (Barbier J.) (hereinafter B1 Bundle). 
25 For a detailed account of the Macondo blowout, see President’s Report supra note 18. 
26 B1 Bundle’s Finding 7 states that “OPA does not displace general maritime law claims against non- 
Responsible parties,” and that “OPA does displace general maritime law claims against Responsible Parties, 
but only with regard to procedure (i.e. OPA’s  [sec. 2713] presentment requirement).” (emphasis added). ….” 
B1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. at 969.  
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by themselves to establish OPA’s displacement of the maritime tort remedy.27 A cumulative  
rationale targets OPA’s duplication of the identical  question addressed by the maritime 
tort: namely, formulation of a remedial regime addressing private claims for economic and 
property losses resulting from seaborne oil discharges.28 Parts II and III illuminate why each 
set of considerations renders displacement distinctly more plausible than not.        
 
 B1 Bundle ultimately stands or falls on its interpretation of OPA’s lack of language 
expressly proscribing either the maritime pollution tort overall or key specific components 
and its related claim that rules announced in two Supreme Court non-OPA cases, Atlantic 
Sounding Company v. Townsend29 and Exxon Shipping Company v. Baker,30 should govern in 
B1 Bundle as well. BP Bundle equates the absence of express proscription with “silence,” 
and silence, so defined, with Congress’s supposed embrace of the prior maritime norm. In 
doing so, of course, it concedes at the same time that it overlooks that “silence” may prove 
as meaningful as verbal expression. In consequence, silence may as well signal Congress’s 
negation, as approval. By ignoring the step required to justify  approval over negation, B1 
Bundle begs the question that lies at the heart of this essay and B1 Bundle itself.  
 
The opinion targets four instances in which its concept of silence immunizes the 
maritime tort from displacement. They include OPA’s silences respecting the direct 
displacement of the maritime tort overall31; of the maritime tort compensatory damages 
that duplicate those enumerated in OPA section 2702(b)32; of maritime punitive 
damages33; and of the entitlement of private plaintiffs under general maritime law to bring 
direct actions against third party defendants such as Halliburton or Cameron.34  
 
B1 Bundle celebrates general maritime law as a parallel track rather than classifies  
it as a defeasible supplement to OPA. This interpretation is perceived to enable the liability 
associated with the OPA inventory of damages to be adjudicated under the Limited Liability 
Act35 and associated Rule F36 procedures simply by switching tracks to accommodate the 
pollution tort’s change of costume to admiralty garb.37 
                                                        
27 Two OPA provisions that meet this criterion are sec. 2702(b)(2)(A)-(F) (OPA’s “covered damages”), see 
Gabarick v. Laurin Maritime (America) Inc., 623 F.Supp.2d 741, 744-46 (E.D. La. 2009); and sec. 2704 (OPA’s 
“limitation of damages” provision) see Part II(C) infra.  
28 See Part II(B) infra. 
29 557 U.S. 404 (2009). 
30 554 U.S. 471 (2008). 
31 B1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 960, 961. 
32 Id. at 962 (by implication). 
33 Id. 
34 Id.  
35 Act of Mar. 3, 1851, Ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635 (codified as reenacted and amended at 46 U.S.C.A. app. secs. 181-189 
(West 1958 & Supp. 1998)(hereinafter Limited Liability Act). 
36 Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. F. 
37 An assessment of B1 Bundle’s device of converting treatment of OPA tort claims into general maritime 
claims for purposes of allocating liability under a Limited Liability Act concursus proceeding exceeds this 
essay’s scope.  It merits attention, however, that OPA precedents holding either or both that OPA displaces 
those general maritime principles to which it speaks directly, and that OPA overrides the Limited Liability Act 
and Rule F undermine the device’s legitimacy. See, e.g., Gabarick v. Laurin Maritime (America) Inc., 623 
F.Supp.2d 741 (E.D. La. 2009); Bouchard Transp. Co. v. Updegraff, 147 F.3rd 1344 (11th Cir. 1998); In re 
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 Later discussion details three B1 Bundle flaws that beset its non-displacement 
outcome. The first has been noted: the opinion blandly asserts, rather than cogently 
establishes its outcome-shaping equation of congressional silence with congressional 
approval of matters not expressly proscribed. Credibility on a matter so central to the 
opinion demands a searching inquiry into OPA’s language, objectives, legislative history, 
and pertinent background factors essential to an understanding of what legal realist Carl 
Llewellyn termed the individual dispute’s “situation-sense.”38  
Second, B1 Bundle shuns engaging in this inquiry or, at least, in linking summary 
conclusions illuminated by it to the non-displacement outcome. The court’s posture is 
problematic given the lack of any pre-B1 Bundle OPA precedents sustaining its position as 
against both a brood of hostile OPA precedents39 and the non-displacement conclusion’s 
pervasive influence on the design and phasing of the entire MDL proceeding. It is 
conceivable perhaps, although not very likely in my judgment, that B1 Bundle’s outcome 
would have proven soundly defensible had it chosen to take OPA seriously by attending 
systematically to the statute’s origins and goals. Its decision to avoid doing so is 
suggestively evasive, however, and leaves OPA to languish at this stage of the MDL,  
“undigested and undigestible in the middle of [the] Law,” as Llewellyn would have put it.40  
 
 Finally, B1 Bundle’s skewed use of displacement jurisprudence’s lexicon leaves 
unattended still another fundamental objection to its outcome: namely, that OPA 
incompatibly addresses the identical question addressed by the maritime pollution tort.  Even 
if no less problematic, this defect is perhaps more understandable than the other two. 
Displacement’s jurisprudence’s abstract, non-quantitative lexicon does not easily yield the 
precise measurements and cross-case statutory and general maritime law comparisons 
essential for cogency and predictability.  
 
Certainty, these qualifications advise, is an illusory standard for displacement inquiries 
in which silence obscures congressional intent. The best that can be done is to identify the 
plausibility of reasoning bearing on the inquiries’ many moving parts, aggregate the 
competing results, and propose an outcome premised on the weight and persuasiveness of 
the competing sides’ totals.41 I have chosen this course for an inquiry that addresses an 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Metlife Capital Corp., 132 F. 3rd 818 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Bunker Group, 1998 U.S.L.W. 159185 
(U.S. June 26, 1998); In re Jahre Spray, 1996 WL 451315 (D.N.J. 1996). A number of the impediments 
besetting the effort are explored in Robert Force & Jonathan Gutoff, Limitation of Liability in Oil Pollution 
Cases: In Search of Concursus or Procedural Alternatives to Concursus, 24 Tul. Mar. L. J. 331, 341 (1998). 
38 Carl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 121 (1960). Authoring a legal opinion and 
authoring commentary on a legal opinion are different enterprises, of course, each subject to the constraints 
of its respective purposes and appropriate length. But a legal opinion shares with legal commentary the 
expectation that its conclusions comport with persuasive analysis and precedent, whether or not the latter 
are detailed in the opinion. 
39 See cases cited infra Part I(A).  
40 Carl Llewellyn, Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals, supra note 38 at 378. 
41 An apt description of the challenge federal judges confront in assessing plausibility appears in Judge Jon 
Newman’s masterful displacement opinion in United States v. Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 339 (2d. Cir. 
1981): “ [W]e recognize, as [Milwaukee II] instructs, that the doctrine of separation of powers creates a 
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opinion so committed to its silence canon and secure in Townsend’s and Baker’s supposed 
reflected grace that the most influential of the inquiry’s moving parts receive glancing 
INattention or are ignored altogether.  
 
The essay can be read simply as an inventory of B1 Bundle’s many unresolved questions, 
or, as I would prefer, a valuable discussion of how their evaluation bears on the 
persuasiveness of the opinion’s outcome.  The inquiry’s terms of debate will discomfort 
those who share the Fifth Circuit’s self-confessed instinct for the “reflexive invocation of 
admiralty jurisdiction.”42 But Delavan tempers, or, at least, should temper the instinct.  
Once the OPA statute’s “relevance” is established, Delavan dictates, the burden of 
persuasion shifts to non-displacement advocates because it is only “[a]bsent a relevant 
statute” that “the general maritime law, as developed by the judiciary, applies.”  
OPA/OCSLA indisputably qualify as “relevant” statutes. 
 
The point is not trivial. The reflexive instinct inclines toward focusing on Delavan’s 
second clause at the expense of the introductory proviso. For the same reason, it 
encourages a parsing of OPA’s misleadingly named “admiralty savings clause” that slights 
its Delavan-like introductory proviso, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Act,” in favor 
of its statement that “[t]his Act does not affect … admiralty and maritime law.”43 
 
 The essay’s roadmap schedules two detours to provision itself for its journey. The first 
engages the BP dispute’s “situation sense” by probing OPA’s background, content and 
reception by commentators and federal courts (Part I).  The second assays leading themes 
and policies, evidenced both in OPA itself and in the Supreme Court’s displacement lexicon 
and jurisprudence (Parts II and III, principally, but some engagement of Part I also). These 
stops proceed with one eye on B1 Bundle, and at appropriate points, gear down to set forth 
and evaluate discrete B1 Bundle contentions.  But they also serve as stand-alone portrayals 
of federal statute/common law displacement jurisprudence and of OPA’s origins and 
structure. They precede Part III’s critique of B1 Bundle’s reliance on Townsend and Baker to 
sustain B1 Bundle’s non-displacement outcome.   
 
Part I portrays the BP dispute’s “situation sense” by contrasting elements of pollution 
liability policy and law affecting private victims’ economic and property loss claims prior to 
and following OPA’s adoption. The portrayal highlights the inadequacy of pre-OPA 
maritime law and statutory regimes and Congress’s effort to remedy them in a 
comprehensive statute covering a broad range of governmental and private interests. The 
section’s survey of the statute’s economic and environmental drivers, OPA commentary 
and pre-B1 Bundle OPA case law illuminates the basis for this essay’s purposive 
interpretation of OPA’s silences.    
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
presumption that legislation preempts the role of federal judges in developing and applying federal common 
law, but we also recognize  that it is not a simple task to determine the force and proper application of this 
presumption.” 
42 See  Lewis v. Glendel Drilling Co., 898 F.2d 1083, 1087 (5th Cir. 1990) (Jones, J.). The BP MDL was assigned 
to the Eastern District of Louisiana, a federal district court located within the Fifth Circuit. 
43 See Part II(F) infra. 
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Nine contentions are advanced in in support of this posture.  
 
First, resolution of B1 Bundle’s displacement debate engages the interaction of three 
distinct legal spheres: the Supreme Court’s meta-law44 of displacement; OPA’s and OCSLA’s 
property- and commerce clause-based environmental and OCS governance directives; and 
the general maritime law oil pollution tort. 
 
Second, B1 Bundle’s silence canon misconceives the Court’s displacement rules and 
policy, and pays insufficient heed to the goals, language and structure of the OPA 
liability/compensation regime.  
 
Third, the relation between Congress and the federal judiciary in the OPA/maritime tort 
pairing is one of competition between two separate lawmaking branches, which pursue the 
formulation, through different and largely incompatible means, of a liability/compensation 
regime for private economic and property losses suffered in consequence of seaborne 
petroleum discharges. 
 
Fourth, the Court’s displacement groundrules and lexicon are shaped by separation of 
powers values, principal among which is the Court’s affirmation of Congress’s 
constitutional primacy over the federal judiciary when congressional and judiciary 
lawmaking overlap in ways that derogate from or are otherwise incompatible with 
Congress’s primacy.  
 
Fifth, as an exercise in judicial lawmaking, B1 Bundle is not a collaborative effort by the 
court, as an agent of Congress, to fill interstitial gaps in an incomplete congressional 
statute. Rather, the opinion aggressively carves out an independent, parallel track, co-equal 
with OPA, for a maritime regime that addresses the same question to which OPA speaks, 
but in a different and pervasively incompatible manner.   
   
Sixth, OPA’s occupancy of “space” previously claimed by the maritime tort warrants the 
latter’s displacement absent evidence of Congress’s contrary intent. Unlike the free-floating 
maritime remedy, moreover, OPA derives and communicates its values as but one facet of 
an integrated framework that encompasses environmental values, federal agency 
rulemaking and expertise, OPA itself, and a graduated program of non-OPA civil and 
criminal penalties. Baked into OPA’s remedial regime, these elements robustly differentiate 
it from the maritime tort regime. Pinning the ill-fitting tail of admiralty’s remedial donkey 
on the identical activity remediated by OPA needlessly complicates a challenging, yet 
relatively straightforward inquiry.   
 
Seventh, OPA section 2751(e), the misleadingly labeled “admiralty savings clause,” does 
not afford a plausible escape route from displacement. The clause’s stubborn restriction on 
                                                        
44 By the term “meta-law,” I intend simply Court-fashioned standards premised on constitutional separation 
of powers values that govern the choice of the positive law to be applied in a displacement dispute. The 
latter’s candidates are federal statutory law, judge-made law (common or maritime), or some combination of 
both.  
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the scope of the admiralty law being “saved” -- ”[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this 
Act”45—deprives admiralty/maritime law of the sweeping immunity to displacement that 
state law enjoys from preemption pursuant to OPA section 2718(a)’s proviso-free state law 
savings clause. Despite or, perhaps, because of its faux title, this “admiralty savings clause” 
weakens, rather than bolsters the case for non-displacement. 
 
Eighth, the Supreme Court’s bar on lower federal courts’ rewriting statutory rules under 
the guise of filling interstitial gaps discredits B1 Bundle’s approval of the maritime tort law 
entitlement to bring direct actions against defendants who are not named as responsible 
parties under OPA section 2702(a). 
 
Finally, B1 Bundle’s bid for the survival of maritime law punitive damages is 
unpersuasive. OPA destroys the requisite survival platform by displacing maritime law’s 
compensatory damages cause of action upon which punitive damages must be predicated. 
B1 Bundle also upsets Congress’s deliberate compromise, engraved initially in FWPCA  
section 311 and updated in OPA section 2704, that accommodates industry, pollution tort 
victim, natural resource protection, and governmental interests through the statute’s 
graduated damages limitation regime, as supplemented by draconian extra-OPA statutory 
civil and criminal penalties. 
 
 
I. OPA: Reinventing the Oil Pollution Tort for a Modern Age  
 
A. OPA’s Reception by Commentators and Federal Courts  
 
Commentators and courts largely endorse Lawrence Kiern’s overall appraisal of OPA  as 
a “watershed event in the history of modern oil pollution law in the United States.”46 They 
recognize that the statutory tort both reconfigures and outdistances the prior maritime tort 
even as it addresses the same fundamental question of remedies spoken to by the latter. 
One jointly authored study, for example, observes that OPA “has introduced radical changes 
in the liability regime applicable to oil spills,”47 and departs from “past practices in 
environmental legislation, [because] Congress expressly created a wide range of remedies 
that are available to private persons … who sustain damage or loss as a result of discharge 
of oil.”48 A second study affirms that the statute “vastly expands the scope and breadth of 
the rights, remedies and recoveries of  … private claimants damaged by an oil spill.”49  
 
                                                        
45 OPA sec. 2751(e) provides in material part that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Act, this Act does not 
affect –(1) admiralty or maritime law; or (2) the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States with 
respect to civil actions under admiralty and maritime jurisdiction .…” (emphasis added). 
46 Lawrence Kiern, Liability, Compensation, and Financial Responsibility under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: 
A Review of the First Decade, 24 Tul. Mar. L. J. 481 (2000) [hereinafter Kiern I]. 
47 Robert Force & Jonathan Gutoff, Limitation of Liability in Oil Pollution Cases: In Search of Concursus or 
Procedural Alternatives to Concursus, supra note 37, at 341.   
48 Id. 
49 Thomas Wagner, 5 U.S. F. Mar. L. J. 283, 285 (1993). 
 10 
In a subsequent study updating OPA 90’s status from 2000 through 2010, Kiern 
concludes that the statute has been “applied by the courts to restrict resort to traditional 
maritime remedies for oil pollution damages apart from OPA.”50 His conclusion goes far 
toward answering his decade-earlier query concerning the event to which “the continued 
availability of both judge made and federal common law causes of action for relief in cases 
of environmental damage have been placed in doubt by congressional enactment of 
comprehensive  environmental legislation including both the CWA and OPA.”51 
 
Judicial portrayals of OPA other than B1 Bundle celebrate a vigorous statute as well. 
Gabarick v. Laurin Maritime (America), Incorporated52 (hereinafter Gabarick) affirms that 
OPA displaces maritime actions seeking damages that duplicate OPA section 2702(b) 
“covered damages.”  Congress, it asserts, adopted OPA to “encourage settlement and reduce 
litigation in oil spill cases through the enactment of comprehensive federal legislation that 
provides ‘cleanup authority, penalties, and liability for oil pollution.’”53 A second insists that 
“OPA establishes an entirely new, federal cause of action for oil spills,”54 and that 
“[a]lthough traditional maritime remedies for oil spills pre-date OPA, OPA creates a new, 
comprehensive federal scheme for the recovery of oil spill cleanup costs and the 
compensation of those injured by such spills… includ[ing] new remedies, which, in many 
respects, preempt traditional maritime remedies.”55 
 
Pre-B1 Bundle OPA jurisprudence discloses general support for the following positions: 
 
1. Displacement.  
 
OPA displaces maritime law in whole or part in light of OPA’s section 2751(e) proviso 
requiring displacement when OPA provides “otherwise” for the same matter56; OPA section 
                                                        
50 Lawrence Kiern, Liability, Compensation, and Financial Responsibility under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: 
A Review of the Second Decade, 36 Tul. Mar. L. J. 1, 50 (2011) [hereinafter Kiern II]. 
51 Kiern I, supra note 45 at 493.  
52 623 F. Supp. 2d 741 (E.D. La. 2009). 
53  Id. at 747-48 
54 Tanguis v. M/V Westchester  153 F. Supp. 2d 859 (E.D. La. 2001). 
55 Id. at 867 (citation omitted). In a third decision that denied remand back to a state court of an OPA 
proceeding, United States v. Bodenger, 2003 WL 22228517 at *1 (E.D. La. 2003), explained that pre-OPA,  
existing federal and state laws provided inadequate cleanup and damage remedies, required large taxpayer 
subsidies for costly cleanup activities, and presented substantial barriers to victims' recoveries such as legal 
defenses, corporate forms, and burdens of proof unfairly favoring those responsible for the spills. Congress also 
recognized that, pre-OPA, the costs of cleanup and damage from spill were not high enough to encourage greater 
industry efforts to prevent spills and develop effective techniques to contain spills that did in fact occur. 
Congress' intention is manifest, that the new law would effect compensation for victims, quick and efficient 
cleanup with minimization of damages to natural resources, and the internalization of the costs of oil spills 
within the oil industry. 
Id. at *2 (paraphrasing Sen. Rep. No. 101-94, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722.  
56 See, e.g., Nat’l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia  v. Moran Mid-Atlantic Corp., 924 F. Supp.1436, 1447 (E.D. Va. 
1996), aff’d sub nom Nat’l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Moran Trade Corp. of Delaware, 1997 WL 560047  
(4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, Nat’l Shipping Co. of Saudia v. Moran Trade Corp. of Delaware, 523 U.S. 
1021(1998); In re Settoon, 2009 WL 4730971 at *3 (E.D. La. 2009). 
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2702(b) “covered damages” duplication of damages awarded under maritime law57; OPA’s 
use of mandatory language in defining the oil pollution tort, damages, and procedures for 
claims presentation by private parties58; the “redundan[cy]”59 or “superflu[ity]”of 
according maritime law status as a parallel track when OPA addresses the same injuries60 
more efficiently and more attuned to contemporary scientific, engineering, environmental 
and policy values; and Congress’s intent through OPA to replace the prior “fragmented 
collection of Federal and State laws….”61 “with a “single Federal law providing cleanup 
authority, penalties, and liability for oil pollution.”62  
 
This inventory calls to mind the story of the five blind men and the elephant, each of 
whom is in touch with the elephant but fails to grasp what lies beyond his particular point 
of contact. Without denying each contribution’s value, Part II describes their place within 
the larger framework of displacement jurisprudence defined by the Supreme Court.  
 
2. OPA’s “Silence” 
 
By itself, OPA’s “silence” does not signal maritime law’s survival because congressional 
intent can be communicated by a statute’s “structure or purpose”63 or by the “text of the 
statute read as a whole.“64 OPA is not “silent” as to particular displacing elements, 
moreover, when it “speaks directly” to them in a manner that is incompatible with 
maritime law, even though in doing so, OPA doesn’t expressly call for their displacement.65  
                                                        
57 See, e.g., Gabarick, 623 F. Supp. 2d 741, 748 (E.D. La. 2009); South Port Marine LLC v. Gulf Oil Ltd Ptnsp, 234 
F. 3rd 58, 65 (1st Cir. 2000); Clausen v. M/V New Carissa, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1133  (D. Or. 2001).  
58 OPA secs. 2713, 2702(a), 2702(b) and 2713(a), respectively, each of which is cited in Gabarick, 623 F. Supp. 
2d at 744. 
59 In re Spray, 1996 WL 451315 at *4 (D.N.J. 1996) (OPA’s provisions for legal defenses and damage 
limitations would be “redundant” unless OPA displaces maritime law). 
60 Clausen v. M/V Carissa, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1127,1134 (D. Or. 2001) (“Why should the plaintiffs’ attempt to 
prove negligence when success on their OPA claim will prove provide identical remedies and not require  
proof of negligence?). Accord:  In re Settoon, 2009 WL 4730971, at * 3 (E.D. La. 2009) (“The United States‘ 
general maritime damages claims are preempted by its identical OPA 90 damages claims.”). Cf. American 
Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2531-32 (2011) (The [Environmental Protection] Act … 
provides a means to seek limits on emissions of carbon dioxide from domestic power plants—the same relief the 
plaintiffs seek by invoking federal common law. There is no room for a parallel track.).  
61 Sen. Rep. 101-94, at 2, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 723. Amplifying the Report’s confirmation of OPA’s 
displacement of other sources of federal law is the statement during debate in the House that the “whole idea 
of a federal oil spill legislation is to have one coordinated and one comprehensive legislation, not a patchwork 
of state and federal laws which have turned out to be inadequate.” Statement of Representative Franzel, 135 
Cong. Rec. H7954, at 7977 Nov. 1, 1989.  
62 Sen. Rep. 101-94, at 2, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 723 (emphasis added). Accord: Gabarick, 623 F. 
Supp. 2d at 748; Tanguis v. M/V Westchester, 153 F. Supp. 2d 849, 867-88 (E.D. La. 2001).  
63 See Gabarick, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 748 (citing Altria Group v. Good 129 S.Ct. 538, 543 (2009). Gabarick was 
responding to the assertion that “because the statutory language of OPA does not contain an explicit 
preemption cause or otherwise expressly preempt the general maritime law, … preemption of general 
maritime claims … was not the intent of Congress.” Id.     (2008). 
64 See Tanguis, 153 F. Supp. 2d 859, 867 (E.D. La. 2001) 
65 In its reference to “speaking directly,” Gabarick invoked Miles v. Apex Marine Corp, 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990), 




Again, each observation is useful, if blandly predictable. As often occurs in displacement 
decisions, however, the larger framework remains incoherent with respect to the 
positioning of such concepts as “structure or purpose,” “speaking directly, ”comprehensive” 
or “occupation of a field.” These constructs, Part II clarifies, are not a random collection of 
independent variables, but incremental locations along a single, orderly continuum. 
 
3. OPA section 2751(e) Admiralty Savings Clause 
 
Pre-B1 Bundle decisions expressly acknowledge the parallelism of syntax employed by 
the Supreme Court in Delavan and by Congress in OPA’s “admiralty savings clause.”66  
Delavan and OPA section 2751(e) each feature an introductory proviso, the purpose of 
which is to withdraw from or deny to maritime law a competence that it might otherwise 
enjoy. The proviso is followed by an independent clause, which secures to maritime law 
competences that are not reserved by the proviso.67   
 
Settoon mirrors these arrangements in its statement that OPA section 2751(e) 
 
does not permit the [claimant] to assert its general maritime law damage claims … in this matter. A court 
will only apply the general maritime law in the absence of a relevant federal statute [citing Delavan]. OPA 90 
specifically provides for the damages sought by the [claimant].… OPA 90’s admiralty and maritime law 
savings clause evidences [the latter law’s] preemption in that it permits the admiralty and maritime law 
claims “except as otherwise provided in [the] Act.”68  
 
Significant consequences attend this verbal architecture. It is enough for now to observe 
how far short of OPA section 2718(a), OPA’s state law savings clause, section 2751(e) falls 
in shielding maritime law from displacement because, among a host of considerations, the 
latter clause state law savings clause is not preceded by a disabling proviso.  
 
4. OPA and Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)69  
 
 Because OPA is modeled on the FWPCA with respect to certain of its key provisions,70 
FWPCA case law and practice merit deference in the interpretation of these provisions.71 
                                                        
66 See, e.g., Nat’l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia  v. Moran Mid-Atlantic Corp., 924 F. Supp.1436, 1447 (E.D. Va. 
1996), aff’d sub nom Nat’l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Moran Trade Corp. of Delaware, 1997 WL 
560047(4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, Nat’l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Moran Trade Corp. of Delaware, 523 
U.S. 1021(1998); In re Settoon, 2009 WL 4730971 at *3 (E.D. La. 2009); cf. Tanguis, 153 F. Supp. 2d, at 867. 
67 One difference between the two formats is that OPA sec. 2751(e) displaces maritime law by non-admiralty 
(statutory) law, while the Delavan proviso speaks to displacement by any federal statute, admiralty or 
otherwise.  
68 Id. at *3 (emphasis in the original) (Lemmon, J.).   
69 Ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. secs. 1251-1376 (2006 & Supp. 2009). 
Although the Act was retitled as the Clean Water Act in consequence of its amendment in 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
500, 86 stat 816, codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. secs. 1251-1387, the former FWPCA sec. 1321 title is 
retained in this article except when quoting other sources or except where a particular context favors either 
the FWPCA or either the “Clean Water Act” (CWA) or “section 311 of the Clean Water Act” (CWA sec. 311). 
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Parallelism in function and language of the FWPCA and OPA provisions being compared, 
however, is imperative to support the claim’s credibility in any specific instance in order to 
avoid what this essay terms a “category error.”72   The issue is tested in two investigations. 
One addresses whether the character of the OPA and FWPCA damage limitation provisions 
warrants citing FWPCA jurisprudence favoring maritime law’s displacement as a basis for a 
similar result under OPA.73 The second is whether B1 Bundle properly invokes the FWPCA, 
Baker or Townsend NO as a basis for concluding that OPA does not displace punitive 
damages.  
 
5. Claimants’ Direct Actions against Third Party Defendants 
 
Common to the pre-B1 Bundle decisions is the understanding that Congress sought to 
expedite private claimant recovery by shifting from maritime law’s burdensome and time-
consuming procedures to OPA’s streamlined alternative.74 Among the pre-B1 Bundle OPA 
precedents, Gabarick speaks to the point with the greatest clarity. It dismissed a suit 
brought by an OPA claimant against a third party defendant, reasoning that  
 
[i]n light of Congress's intent to minimize piecemeal lawsuits and the [OPA’s] mandatory language [in 
section 2702(a) and (b) and 2713(a)] …, it appears that Claimants should pursue claims covered 
under OPA only against the responsible party and in accordance with the procedures established by 
OPA. Then, the responsible party can take action to recover from third parties.75 
 
Subsequent discussion will introduce two elements suggested, but not specifically 
addressed by Gabarick. The first is that OPA’s “silence” regarding claimants’ direct suit in 
this instance does not give rise to an interstitial statutory “gap” that invites the final 
carpentry of judicial completion. The second links OPA’s remedial substitute to 
environmental innovations during the 1980’s decade designed to secure accelerated cost-
recovery, including, in particular, the procedures and status liability assigned to potentially 
responsible parties” under CERCLA Superfund legislation.76  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
70 The “body of law already established under section 311 of the Clean Water Act is the foundation of the 
reported bill. Many of section’s concepts and provisions are adopted directly or by reference.” Sen. Rep. 101-
94,  at p. 4; U.S.C.C.A.N. 772, 726. 
71 In re Metlife Capital Corp., 132 F.3rd 818, 822 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Bodenger, 2003 WL 22228517 
at *2 (E.D. La. 2003). 
72 See Part II infra. 
73 See Part II(C).  
74 OPA section 2713(a) states that “all claims for removal costs and damages  [pursuant to OPA sections 
2702(a) and (b)] shall be presented first to the responsible party or [its] guarantor.” OPA sec. 2702(a) 
precedes its definition of the statutory tort’s elements with the language “[n]otwithstanding any other 
provision or rule of law and subject to the provisions of this Act ….” Sec. 2702(b), entitled “Covered removal 
costs and damages,” identifies the damages inventoried in sec. 2702(b)(2)(A)-(F) as the “damages referred to 
in [section 2702(a)].” Section 2715(a) authorizes subrogation actions against third parties by responsible 
parties or by the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund when the Fund has paid the damages of a claimant who elects 
under sec. 2713(a)(2) to seek recourse against the Fund rather than to sue the responsible party.  
75 Gabarick , 623 F.Supp. 2d, at 750. 
76 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. secs. 9601-9675 
(“CERCLA”). Compare OPA sec. 2701(32) (definition of a “responsible party”) with 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(2006) 
(“covered parties,” also termed “potentially responsible parties”). 
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6. OPA and Maritime Law Punitive Damages 
 
South Port Marine, LLC v. Gulf Oil Limited Partnership77 in tandem with Clausen v. M/V 
Carissa,78 denies that OPA itself provides for punitive damage and asserts that OPA 
displaces the maritime law doctrine that does. It advances three independent grounds for 
displacement. The first, as clarified in Clausen,79 is that punitive damages are not 
themselves a cause of action, and therefore require the latter as a necessary predicate. In 
displacing the maritime tort, OPA severs the requisite link between these damages and an 
underlying cause of action. The second looks to the Supreme Court’s decision in Miles v. 
Apex Marine,80 which denied recovery for loss of society when the latter were not provided 
in statute.81 The third insists that approving maritime punitive damages upsets the balance 
Congress sought by tempering its support of expanded private relief with a damages 
limitation regime appreciative of petroleum development’s contributions to national 
security, economic health and public revenues.  
 
Part III does not take issue with B1 Bundle’s Miles-based objection, but suggests that 
South Port Marine’s first and third contentions, which B1 Bundle largely ignores or 
misconceives, merit very careful attention indeed.    
 
B. The Oil Discharge Tort’s Transition from a Maritime to a Statutory Remedy 
 
OPA’s birthing was preceded by decades-long frustration with pre-OPA governmental 
and private remedies, whose inadequacies were further amplified by a succession of pre-
1990 oil spills.82  With the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster as the last straw, Congress 
unanimously approved OPA ’90 in order to replace the prior “fragmented collection of 
Federal and State laws….”83 “with a “single Federal law providing cleanup authority, 
penalties, and liability for oil pollution.”84  In reconfiguring oil pollution regulation, 
Congress added OPA’s coverage of private claims for economic and property loss, an 
element conspicuously absent from the FWPCA.  “Following enactment of this Act,” the 
                                                        
77 234 F.3rd 58 (1st Cir. 2000).  
78 171 F. Supp. 49, at 2d 1127 (D. Or. 2001). 
79 Clausen, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1133.  
80 498 U.S. 19 (1990). 
81 Id. at 31. 
82 The general maritime law’s inability to keep stride with the oil pollution discharge problem was 
appreciated prior to OPA’s adoption. Addressing the FWPCA’s cleanup liability regime a decade before this 
event, for example, United States v. Bear Mountain Services, 509 F. Supp. 710 (D.C. La. 1980), lamented that 
the “magnitude of the problem had outstripped the viability of available legal remedies, particularly the 
traditional concept of the maritime tort.” Id. at 713 (emphasis added).  
83 Sen. Rep. 101-94, at 2, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 723. Amplifying the Report’s confirmation of OPA’s 
displacement of other sources of federal law is the House debate statement that the “whole idea of a federal 
oil spill legislation is to have one coordinated and one comprehensive legislation, not a patchwork of state 
and federal laws which have turned out to be inadequate.” Statement of Representative Franzel, 135 Cong. 
Rec. H7954, at 7977 Nov. 1, 1989.  
84 Sen. Rep. 101-94, at 2, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 723 (emphasis added).  
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Committee advised, “liability and compensation for petroleum oil pollution damages caused by a 
discharge from a vessel or facility will be determined in accordance with this Act.”85 
 
Congress placed OPA’s liability/compensation regime within a larger framework featuring 
three additional components: environmental protection as the framework’s lodestar86; oil 
spill prevention and cleanup oversight through regulation by multiple federal agencies87; 
and a calibrated set of deterrence-incentivizing civil and criminal penalties that implement 
OPA’s “polluters pay” philosophy.88 To an observer familiar only with the maritime 
pollution tort, OPA’s remedial regime is incomprehensible in light of the manner in which 
Congress baked these novel and far-reaching values into the regime’s configuration.  
 
OPA’s radical departure from the judge-made, negligence-based maritime oil pollution 
tort, however, confirms the statute as a creature of an entirely different era and legal 
mindset. OPA endorses strict liability and the latter’s correlative indifference to fault, 
causation, and array of negligence-based defenses.89 It embraces a “polluter pays” vision 
that, nonetheless, respects a limitations/breakable caps regime.90 It imposes status liability 
on responsible parties91 who, whether or not ultimately found liable, must front response 
and damages costs,92 a requirement designed to compensate public and private claimants 
with minimum delay. Responsible parties are relegated to contribution or subrogation 
                                                        
85 Sen. Rep.101-94, at p. 25, reprinted in 1989 U.S.S.C.A.N, at p. 746-47. 
86 “OPA’s essential elements are built on the basic framework of the environmental legislation Congress 
enacted during the 1970s and 1980s, since OPA was enacted to address the major deficiencies in the 
preexisting legislation.” Kiern I, supra note 46 at 507.  Elliott and Houlihan add that OPA “was deeply 
influenced by the prevailing legal culture of the 1980’s and 1990’s,” and that its key provisions “were 
borrowed from the 1980’s [CERCLA] Superfund.” E. Donald Elliott & Mary Beth Houlihan, A Primer on the 
Law of Oil Spills 2 (2010) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2007604, last visited on June 30, 2013 
(hereinafter Primer). Congress likewise provided for environmental values that it ignored in OCSLA’s  original 
(1953) version  by pervasively rewriting the statute in 1978 to fill this void. See Costonis II, supra note 16 at 
541-55.   
87 Illustrative, inter alia, are the rulemaking responsibilities allocated, first, to the United States Coast Guard to 
govern Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund obligations and agreements pursuant to OPA sec. 2716(a) and to oversee 
the financial liability of responsible parties for certain vessels and offshore facilities under OPA sec. 2712(e), 
and, second, to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in conjunction with the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency and Fish and Wildlife Service under OPA sec. 2706 (e) for the assessment of 
natural resource damages.  
88 Civil and criminal penalties fall outside of OPA for the most part. Among the best known is FWPCA sec. 
1321(b)(7)(D) (as modified by 40 C.F.R. sec. 19.4 (2010), authorizing civil penalties up to $4300 per barrel of 
oil for violations resulting from “gross negligence or willful misconduct.” Assuming that published figures 
placing the BP discharge at 4.9 million barrels are correct, the penalties under this section against BP could 
mount to $20 billion.  For a detailed review of the various penalties, civil and criminal associated with OPA-
related violations, see E. Donald Elliott & Mary Beth Houlihan, Primer note 86 supra, at pp. 16-22.  
89 OPA secs. 27012(17) and 2702(a). 
90 OPA sec. 2704. This provision’s role in contributing to OPA’s displacement of maritime law is detailed in   
TAN 134 supra. 
91 See OPA secs. 2701(32) and 2702(a). Removal costs and damages are compensable “regardless of the 
source of the spill.” Sen. Rep. No. 101-94 at p. 4, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.A.A.N. 772, 726. The Oil Spill Liability 
Trust Fund, moreover, provides compensation for damages “regardless of the liability of the spiller.” Id. at p.5, 
1990 U.S.C.A.A.N., at p. 727. 
92 See OPA secs. 2702(d)(1)(A) and (B) 
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actions to secure recompense against other liable parties.93 OPA’s compensation and 
liability provisions are intricately crafted to pair with a command and control regulatory 
program on the one side,94 and a variety of civil and criminal fines and penalties on the 
other.95  
 
OPA’s section 2713 procedures governing private claims lie at the heart of a system 
that Congress dedicated to avoiding lengthy delays in damages payments experienced by 
pre-OPA claimants. Claimants and responsible parties are given the opportunity to resolve 
the matter between themselves within 90 days of the claims presentation, failing which the 
former may seek satisfaction by pressing their claims either in court or before OPA’s 
section 2712 Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.96  
 
 E. Donald Elliott, EPA’s General Counsel during the federal government’s 
deliberations on the legislative proposals that became OPA, cites these and related OPA 
provisions in a co-authored article observing that OPA is “deeply influenced by the 
prevailing legal culture of the 1980’s and 1990s,”97 and that its key provisions “were 
borrowed from … the 1980s Superfund.”98 Also borrowed was the “essence of the EPA’s 
policy for implementing the 1986 Superfund amendments –do not delay clean-up while the 
PRPs argued about shares, but threaten to give one of them an administrative order to 
clean up the site and then that responsible party may sue the others for contribution.”99  
Elliott describes this claims procedure as “unique with no analogical procedure under 
Superfund, the FWPCA or any other major federal environmental statute,” and, needless to 
say, under general maritime law. 
 
These features were neither perceived nor embraced when admiralty judges extended 
general admiralty tort principles to petroleum discharges earlier in the twentieth 
century.100 Like OPA itself, they and the comprehensive framework they support are 
                                                        
93 See OPA secs. 2702(d)(1)(B) (subrogation), 2708 (recovery by responsible parties), and 2709 
(contribution by any “person”). 
94 E. Donald Elliott has observed in a co-authored study that OPA was adopted “against an existing regulatory 
backdrop” framed largely by the United States Department of the Interior’s Mineral Mining Service (since 
renamed Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement) which “ mandat[es] specific 
drilling practices and technological controls as well as government oversight and review and approval of 
drilling plans.” E. Donald Elliott & Mary Beth Houlihan, Primer, supra note 86 at p. 2. “OPA 90” was drafted 
“[a]gainst this regulatory backdrop.” Id. 
95 Id. at 16-23. 
96 OPA sec. 2713(c). 
97 E. Donald Elliott & Mary Beth Houlihan, Primer, note 86, at p. 2. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 4, n. 22. See Sen. Rep. No. 101-94 at p. 10 
100 See Kiern I, supra note 46 at 490-502. Robert Peltz portrays maritime case law through the late-1960’s as 
“not particularly concerned with the possibility of oil pollution disasters  .… [because] early environment-
related casers were limited largely to local fishing and similar conservation issues.” Robert Pelz, The Myth of 
Uniformity in Maritime Law, 103, 126 (1996).  Post-1950’s admiralty courts’ evident struggle to rationalize 
remedial options within the maritime tort rubric appears in, e.g., Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252, 256 
(9th Cir. 1973) (incorrectly construing Executive Jet as requiring that the activities of the oil pollution victim 
rather than of the tort’s author to be substantially related to a traditional maritime activity); California v. 
Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922, 927-29 (C.D. Cal. 1969)(resting admiralty jurisdiction on a non-statutory lien 
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creatures, first, of post-1950 political, technological and economic forces driving petroleum 
development in territorial and OCS waters,101 and, second, of the post-1970 environmental 
age,102 which was itself shocked into existence by the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill. The 
values shaping the maritime tort speak to earlier eras, indifference to or ignorance of 
environmental values,103 and, with a single dissonant exception, the cabining of oil 
pollution liability on behalf of shippers, insurers, and a nineteenth century nation eager to 
protect its infant merchant marine. 
 
Maritime tort values translate into an evidentially burdensome negligence standard, the 
Limited Liability Act’s scant damages caps, delays associated with the concurrent 
disposition of primary and third party claims, and other complications bearing on parties 
and types of injuries for which compensation may be awarded. Among the latter is the 
tort’s incorporation of the Robins doctrine, which denies recovery to oil discharge victims 
(other than commercial fishermen) absent injury to their physical property.104 Contrarily, 
the maritime pollution tort borrowed the award of punitive damage from maritime general 
negligence law,105 a feature that reflects the tort’s randomness when measured against its 
pro-shipper/industry cast. Overall, however, federal judges formulated a largely 
parsimonious tort totally unequipped for the sweeping technological and economic 
changes lying ahead and for the ever more calamitous blowouts and spills they portend.106 
 
Judicial awareness of either would not have made much of a difference in any event. The 
half-century struggle of Congress and multiple federal agencies to overcome oil pollution 
regulation’s political, technological, economic and public revenue- gathering dimensions 
places the effective resolution of its remedial challenge well beyond maritime lawmaking’s 
competence or inclination. Absent congressional protection of private economic and 
property interests,107 however, it fell to admiralty judges to improvise as best they could to 
protect the federal interest in the governance of private torts occurring on the nation’s 
navigable waters. Despite its evident drawbacks, the maritime tort merits praise as a 
placeholder,108 pending Congress’s restructuring of the private (and public) dimensions of 
the tort through OPA’s enactment.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
derived by  an obviously forced analogy from non-pollution scenarios featuring injury to property by 
conversion); Maine v. M/V Tamano, 3545 F. Supp. 1097 (D.C. Maine 1973) (improvising a state’s standing to 
sue for injury to its natural resources by categorizing the action as an expression of the state’s “quasi-
sovereign” capacity to function as the parens patriae of these public resources).   
101 See President’s Report, supra note 18, ch. 3.  
102 See Robert Pelz, The Myth of Uniformity in Maritime Law, supra note 100.  
103 Recognizing the fundamental difference between the two pursuits, Robert Pelz endorses separating 
environmental law issues out from admiralty’s uniformity concerns. They pose problems that “traditional 
maritime law does not address” because they “did not exist in the past or were not considered important.” Id. 
at p. 126.   
104 See Thomas Schoenbaum, I Admiralty and Maritime Law, secs. 11-12, 14-7, and 18-4 (5th ed. 2011).  
105 See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008). 
106 For assessments both past and future of the scope of the problem and its risks, see President’s Report, note 
18 supra at chs. 6, 9 & 10.   
107 Pre-OPA federal pollution statutes going as far back as 1924 lacked a private cause of action for petroleum 
discharges.   
108 Placeholding by the judicial formulation of federal maritime or common law rules in the absence of 
Congress’s resolution of issues of national concern enjoys the Supreme Court’s firm endorsement as a valid 
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With OPA, however, Congress succeeded in fusing the liability and compensation 
provisions of four prior site-specific oil pollution acts109 into a modern, precisely 
coordinated program. Congress also fashioned a private remedy that absorbs and dwarfs 
the maritime tort in scope and procedural detail110 while speaking to the identical question 
that the earlier maritime tort has been struggled so unsuccessfully to address. 
 
C. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 Preamble: “AN ACT to establish limitations on liability for damages 
resulting from oil pollution ….”111 
 
 OPA’s reforms undoubtedly advantage private claimants. But OPA’s Preamble 
establishes that OPA is also a damages limitation statute, as Lawrence Kiern properly 
counsels.112 Congress sought to temper these private advantages, as monetized, to 
accommodate vital national security, economic and public revenue values served by the 
offshore oil industry, and, undoubtedly, to facilitate OPA’s passage. The compromise takes 
form in the CWA’s section 311(b)(2)(f)(1)-(3)’s damages limitation provisions.  
 
The provisions’ legislative history and their judicial reception merit scrutiny because 
“the body of law already established under section 311 of the Clean Water Act is the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
justification for federal judicial lawmaking. See TAN 189 infra.  Relevant to the placeholder discussions in text 
is the Fourth Circuit’s view of the maritime pollution tort as a placeholder pending Congress’s adoption of the 
FWPCA which, in turn, displaced the maritime tort. See Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 
609 (4th Cir. 1979). Holding that FWPCA sec. 1321(f)(1) displaced the maritime tort, the court stated that 
latter was “ inferred from the … maritime law precisely because no adequate statutory remedy existed. “ Id. at 
61. 
109 See OCSLA, ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. 1331-1356(a) (2009); 
Deepwater Port Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-627, 88 Stat. 2126 (1975), at 33 U.S.C. secs. 1501-24 (2006); 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 584 (1973), at 43 U.S.C. secs. 1651 et seq. 
(2006); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. 
secs 1251-1376 (2006 & Supp. 2009).          
110 OPA, through subchapter I and with the inclusion of sec. 2751(e) of subchapter II, requires approximately 
23 pages, and includes 22 provisions, the greater part of which govern both the private and the public 
statutory tort, and discerningly address the various matters reviewed in this essay. 112’s total of seven 
provisions, on the other hand, runs a page or less in print.) Representative of the provisions’ content are sec. 
2701 (a four-page definitions section of fundamental substantive import), sec. 2702 (a) (cause of action), sec. 
2702(b) (covered damages), sec. 2703 (responsible party/sole fault third party defenses); sec. 2704 (liability 
limitation schedule and requirements), sec. 2705 (interest awards, partial claims payments); secs. 2709 and 
2715 (actions for contribution and subrogation), sec. 2710 (indemnification agreements), sec. 2712 (Oil Spill 
Liability Trust Fund), sec. 2713 (claimant recovery procedure), sec. 2716 (vessel and facility owners’ financial 
responsibility), sec. 2717 (litigation, jurisdiction venue and independent statutes of limitations for actions for 
damages, for removal costs, for contribution, and for subrogation), sec. 2718(a) (state law savings clause); 
sec. 2719 (reserved state and federal authority), and sec. 2751(e) (admiralty savings clause). contributory 
negligence, survival, and damages.” The length of a statute alone is a crude gauge for assessing its 
comprehensiveness, of course. But as illuminated by their evaluation throughout this essay, the provisions’  
content, precision and scope manifest statutory density of an order, Parts II(A) and (B) affirm, more than 
sufficient to support OPA’s displacement of the maritime tort on the several different grounds there 
discussed.  
111 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380 Preamble, 104 stat. 484. 
112 See Kiern II, supra note 50 at p. 54 ([T]he first expressed purpose of OPA is to ‘establish limitations on 
liability for damages resulting from oil pollution…’”).  
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foundation of the reported [OPA] bill.”113 They illuminate both the structure of the 
compromise Congress struck in seeking a balanced damages limitation regime,114 and the 
federal courts’ unanimous agreement that the regime’s implementation in CWA section 311 
displaces the federal government’s maritime cause of action against owner/operators.115  
 
United States v. Steuart Transportation Company116 lists as values shaping the  
compromise section 311’s impacts on maritime commerce; insurance availability and 
premiums; economic needs of shippers, vessel owners and consumers; and the federal 
government fiscal needs.117 The House and Senate bills went in different directions; the 
House proposing liability based on fault and an absolute limit on removal costs, and the 
Senate, strict liability within a maximum limit subject to certain defenses.118 ”The final bill,” 
Steuart continues, ”embodied the Senate's strict liability proposal, but imposed unlimited 
liability only in cases where the government could show willful negligence or willful 
misconduct within the privity and knowledge of the shipowner.”119  
 
CWA litigation centered on the federal government’s effort to employ a maritime 
remedy to obtain the difference between the section 311 cap and the government’s actual 
recovery costs. Impeding this outcome were not only its rejection by the courts, of course,  
but the Limited Liability Act, the principal contributor to this outcome. Over a period of a  
century and half, the Act has fused with the maritime negligence actions as tightly as the 
CWA and OPA damages limitation provisions intertwine with their statutory hosts. When 
pleaded to limit ship owners’ damages in a maritime tort action, the Act reduces the latter 
to the Act’s salvage value/freight pending formula if the incident’s simple negligence occurs 
without the ship owner’s knowledge or privity.120  
 
But the federal courts rebuffed the CWA parallel track claim for government/owner-
operator suits,121 citing the outright conflict between the CWA remedy, as conditioned by 
                                                        
113 Sen. Rep. No. 101-94, at p. 4, 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 726. 
114 CWA sec. 311(b)(2) (f) (1)-(3) address owners of vessels, of on-shore facilities and of offshore facilities, 
respectively, all of whom are subject to a remedial regime of limited defenses, strict liability for oil discharge 
incidents in the amount of actual removal costs, caps that may reduce owner liability to an amount less than 
actual costs, and an increase of liability to the full amount of the costs in the event of owner willful negligence 
or willful misconduct.  
115 See, e.g., Frederick E. Bouchard, Inc. v. United States, 583 F. Supp.  477 (D.C. Mass. 1984); United States v. 
Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Hokkaido Fisheries Co., 506 F. Supp. 631 (D. Alaska 
1981); United States v. Dixie Carriers, 627 F. 2d 736 (5th Cir. 1980); Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 
506 F.2d 609, 614 (4th Cir. 1979).  
116 596 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1979). 
117 Id at 617. 
118 Id. at 613 
119 Id.  
120 Limited Liability Act, 46 U.S.C.A sec. 30505(1) and (2). 
121 The maritime track did survive actions engaging CWA 311(h)(2) against either sole- fault or partial-fault 
third parties because this section sets forth a generous savings clause that preserves ”any rights” the United 
States may have “against any “third party whose actions may  … have caused or contributed the discharge of 
oil….” See, e.g., United States v. Bear Marine Services, 509 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. La. 1980); cf. United States v. M/V 
Big Sam, 681 F.2d 342  (5th Cir. 1982) (right to maritime suit against CWA sec. 311(g) sole-fault third party 
preserved under CWA sec. 311(h)(2)).   
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its section 311 damages limitation requirement, and the maritime negligence remedy as 
qualified by the Limited Liability Act. United States v. Oswego Barge Corporation pinpoints 
the displacement-creating objection in a rationale that speaks for an entire generation of 
section 311 opinions.   
 
 If the FWPCA means what it says in permitting recovery of full cleanup costs upon proof of “willful 
negligence or willful misconduct” within the knowledge and privity of the owner, such a remedy would be 
inconsistent with a maritime negligence remedy, since the latter would avoid the limits of the Limitation 
Act simply upon proof of ordinary negligence within the privity or knowledge of the owner. While 
alternative remedies with dissimilar characteristics can sometimes coexist side by side, when two 
remedies differ on such an essential element of a cause of action as the degree of negligence that must be 
demonstrated in order to permit unlimited recovery, the remedies become inconsistent. To permit a 
judge-made remedy so significantly different from the one Congress has expressly provided would 
amount to rewriting the rule that Congress has enacted.122 
 
 Oswego’s “inconsistency” will differ according to which of four ascending scenarios it 
engages. Under the first, a non-negligent oil discharger is strictly liable under CWA section 
311, but escapes both maritime tort negligence liability and the elements of the Limited 
Liability Act discussed below. Second, the latter act could reduce the federal government’s 
recovery well below section 311’s cap in consequence of act’s application of its vessel 
salvage value/pending freight formula to ordinary negligent incidents beyond the 
“knowledge or privity” of the owner/operator.123 The third scenario is posed in Oswego 
itself in which sec. 311’s caps fall below damages that would be recoverable in a maritime 
tort simple negligence incident in which knowledge and privity are attributed to the 
owner/operator who has not engaged in gross negligence or willful misconduct.124 The 
section 311 caps apply, that is, even if they are less than the full amount of recovery costs; 
but the maritime tort, subjects the owner/operator to liability for the full (compensatory) 
amount of the cost on the basis of ordinary negligence alone.  
  
 The fourth scenario features an owner/operator who has engaged in willful negligence 
or misconduct sufficient to trigger both cancellation of section 311’s caps and the award of 
maritime law punitive damages. CWA 311(b)(2)(f)(1)-(3), provides only for compensatory 
relief –termed in these subsections as the “full amount of the costs.” The maritime award, 
on the other hand, would include both this compensatory amount and some additional 
multiple of the latter as punitive damages.  
 
                                                        
122 Oswego, 664 F.2d at 343-44. 
123 See In re Hokkaido Fisheries Co., 506 F. Supp. 631 (D.C. Alaska 1981) (allowing only $48,489 for salvage 
value/freight pending as against government response costs of $2,780,000; the total amount of the sec. 311 
caps is not disclosed in the opinion but likely substantially exceeded the value/freight pending amount).   
124 Cf. Nat’l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Moran Mid-Atlantic Corp., 924 F. Supp.1436, 1447 (E.D. Va. 1996), 
aff’d sub nom Nat’l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Moran Trade Corp. of Delaware, 1997 WL 560047  (4th Cir. 
1997), cert. denied, Nat’l Shipping Co. of Saudi v. Moran Trade Corp. of Delaware, 523 U.S. 1021(1998).  
National Shipping demonstrates the restraint OPA’s damages limitation regime impose upon private 
claimants. An OPA claimant whose status liability of some $1,269,000 as an oil discharger was transferred to 
a non-willful/non-grossly negligent third party, i.e, a party liable solely for “ordinary negligence, was 
nonetheless denied  $769,000 of this payout in its contribution action against the third party because OPA 
secs. 2702((d)((2)(A) and 2704(a) capped the latter’s liability at $500,00.  
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 The scenarios’ inconsistency with maritime law does not plague section 311 because 
the section’s damage limitations regime engages the United States alone, the sole section 
311 plaintiff in the scenario. In the Ninth Circuit’s view, the same reason explains why 
Baker (maritime remedy allowed for a private claimant recovering maritime punitive 
damages) is not inconsistent with Oswego (no maritime remedy allowed for the United 
States for recovery of response costs against owner/operator).   
 
[Oswego] read[s] [section 311] as we do, and concluded that its remedies section preempted the 
Government’s non-FWPCA remedies against a discharging vessel. It does not speak at all to private 
remedies for private harms, just to whether the government can seek remedies unfettered by the 
limitations on the government’s own remedies in [section 311].125  
 
If maritime rules were deemed displaced by section 311, moreover, private victims 
of oil spills would be unfairly disadvantaged when, as in B1 Bundle126 or under general 
maritime preemption principles, state remedies prove to be unavailable. Inspired by the 
plight of the remediless private plaintiff in its Baker ruling, the Ninth Circuit declared that 
the “absence of any private right of action in the [Clean Water] Act for damage from oil 
pollution may more reasonably be construed as leaving private claims alone than as 
implicitly destroying them.127  
 
But the harmony gracing Baker’s CWA/maritime law pairing flees with OPA’s 
embrace of private claimants. The impressive benefits conferred on the latter under the 
OPA statutory tort remedy come at the price of the restrictions that OPA’s section 2704 
damages limitation regime imposes on the dollar amount owed them by responsible 
parties.128  
 
Other than its extension to private claimants, the OPA regime mirrors its CWA section 
311 counterpart despite changes that broadened the statute’s scope. In re Metlife Capital 
Corporation confirms that the FWPCA cases sustaining section 311’s displacement of 
maritime remedies are “persuasive [under OPA as well] because ‘[n]either the language of 
OPA nor its legislative history suggests that OPA's provisions should be construed contrary 
                                                        
125 In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F. 3rd 1215, 1232 (9th Circuit 2001), aff’d sub nom Exxon Shipping Co., v Baker, 
554 U.S. 471 (2008) (emphasis in original). General maritime law’s displacement in governmental actions 
under 311 comports with numerous federal decisions holding the sec. 311 impliedly or expressly supersedes 
Limited Liability Act. See, e.g.. In re Hokkaido Fisheries Co., 506 F. Supp. 631 (D. Alaska 1981) (express 
override); United States v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 627 F.2d 736 (C.A. La. 1980) (implied override); Accord: 2 
Thomas Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law sec. 18-3, at p. 293, n. 27. Eschewing B1 Bundle’s silent 
canon error, Dixie Carriers grounds its holding on congressional intent as evidenced this body’s commitment 
to “achieve a balanced and comprehensive remedial scheme by matching limited recovery with strict liability 
and unlimited recovery with proof of willful conduct ….”  Dixie Carriers, 627 F. 2d at 739.” 
126 See B1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 943, 951-58 (E.D. La. 2011) (BP oil pollution’s source was external to state 
territorial waters, hence, state law was preempted by national maritime law; alternatively, BP discharge not 
“within” a state is unprotected by OPA sec. 21718(a)(1)(A)’s savings provision).    
127 In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3rd 1215, 1232 (9th Cir. 2001).  
128 See the discussion in note 124 supra concerning the denial to a non-negligent discharging OPA claimant of 
more than half of its payments for response costs and discharge victim damages claims because OPA’s 
damage limitations regime capped the negligent third party’s liability at less than half of the claimant’s OPA 
payout.   
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to the settled law applicable to FWPCA when OPA was enacted.’”129 OPA section 2702(b)’s 
damages were added to supplement pollution removal costs, for example, and damages 
caps were increased under OPA section 2704. But Metlife, OPA’s legislative history130 and 
OPA section 2704 itself confirm that Congress remains as committed in OPA as it was in the 
CWA to balancing remedies with restraint.  
 
Resurfacing in OPA, therefore, are CWA section 311’s familiar framework of strict 
liability, limited defenses, caps for removal costs as well as for OPA 2702(b)’s newly 
inaugurated private (and governmental) damages; and cancellation of these caps in the 
event, inter alia, of the discharger’s “gross negligence” or “willful misconduct.” With either 
of the latter, liability increases from the OPA cap to actual, i.e., compensatory, removal costs 
or damages.131 Additionally, Congress left no doubt that OPA expressly supersedes the 
Limited Liability Act.132  The statute, its legislative history discloses, would “virtually 
eliminate[] any meaningful liability on the part of the owner or operator and would unravel 
the balance of liability set forth herein.”133  
 
Oswego ultimately premised the maritime pollution tort’s displacement on the 
“inconsistencies” between the damages limitation requirements of the tort and of CWA 
section 311. Baker escapes the inconsistencies only because the exclusion of private 
claimants as CWA plaintiffs also excluded the latter from the demands of the section 311 
regime. Were private claimants similarly excluded from OPA, Baker would persuasively 
have carried the day for B1 Bundle on this narrow question.  
 
D. OCSLA and the OPA: The Non-Admiralty Statutory Dimension of the Mixed Admiralty/Non-
Admiralty BP Blowout    
 
OPA and OCSLA do not take kindly to maritime law’s supposed access to a parallel track 
co-equal with these statutes.134 The proviso to OPA’s admiralty savings clause is hostile to 
                                                        
129 In re Metlife Capital Corp., 132 F.2rd 818, 821 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Bunker Group, Inc. v. 
United States, 524 U.S. 952 (1998) (quoting William Duncan, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990’s Effect on 
Shipowners’ Limited Liability Act, 5 U.S.F. Mar. L. J 303, 316 (1993).   
130 Sen. Rep. No. 101-94, at pp. 13-14, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 735-36; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-653, 
at pp. 105-08, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 732, 783-85. In re Matter of Spray (Jahre), 1996 WL 451315, at 
*4 (D.N.J. 1996) observes that in formulating OPA, the “various government bodies devised modern legislative 
schemes that would supersede the Limited Liability Act and set liability limits that are more realistic when 
addressing an oil spill with a major environmental impact.”  
131 OPA’s text leaves no doubt that the “damages” to which OPA sec. 2702(b) refers are compensatory 
damages only. See OPA sec. 2701(3), which defines a “claim” as a “request … for compensation for damages or 
removal costs resulting from [a section 2702(a)] incident”; OPA sec. 2701(4), which defines “claimant” as 
“any person … who presents a claim for compensation under this subchapter; and OPA sec. 2701(5), which 
defines “damages” as “damages specified in section 2702(b) of this title.” 
132 See, .e.g, OPA sec. 2718(a); 2718(c). 
133 Sen. Rep. No. 101-94, at pp. 13-14; reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 735-36 (emphasis added). Compare  In 
re Hokkaido Fisheries Co., 506 F. Supp. 631, 634 (D. Alaska 1981) (“In the face of a Congressional design so 
clearly expressed, it would be incongruous to hold that the 130 year old Limitation Act could frustrate the 
entire scheme.”) 
134 OCSLA finds its constitutional footing in the commerce clause, see Smith v. Pan Air  
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maritime rules that are offer solutions “otherwise than” those “provided for” by the 
statute’s provisions. Moreover, OCSLA’s legislative history, as confirmed by the Supreme 
Court in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company135and Herb’s the Welding v. Gray136 
denies camaraderie between admiralty law and OCS petroleum development. Executive Jet, 
amplifies the tension with its counsel that the fit is best when the issue falls within 
admiralty law’s core interests and experience, and poorest, when it does not.     
 
These observations, detailed at length elsewhere,137 need detain us only briefly here. 
Congress disdained admiralty law’s fitness to govern OCS drilling platform activity as well 
as the OCS itself as far back as the 1953 debates on OCSLA’s adoption. It rejected a bill 
proposing the option in hearings that included the testimony that “[m]aritime law in the 
strict sense has never had to deal with the resource in the ground beneath the sea, and its 
whole tenor is ill adapted for that purpose.”138 In Rodrigue ,139 the Supreme Court invoked 
this statement to conclude that “the most sensible interpretation of Congress’s reaction to 
this testimony is that admiralty treatment was eschewed altogether….”140 and added that 
“maritime law [is] inapposite” as a governance vehicle for OCS activities occurring on OCS 
drilling platforms.141  In its subsequent decision in Herb’s Welding v. Gray, the Court 
excoriated as “untenable” the claim that “offshore drilling is maritime commerce.” 142 It 
cited Rodrigue as establishing that OCSLA’s legislative history “at the very least forecloses 
the … holding that offshore drilling is a maritime activity,”143 and added for good measure 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 Corp, 684 F.2d 1102, 1107 n. 12 (5th Cir. 1982) (OCSLA “depends on national sovereignty and the commerce 
clause.”) (Rubin, J.). Congress’s 1978 amendment of OCSLA confirmed the statute’s shared footing under the 
property clause. See Costonis I, supra note 16, at. p. 541. OPA provisions falling outside of admiralty law 
pursuant to OPA sec. 2751(e) are rooted in the commerce clause; the property clause is also engaged in the 
Macondo OCS blowout insofar as OPA governs the tortious consequences of oil discharges associated with 
OCS drilling activities. See OPA sec. 2701(24) (defining “Outer Continental Shelf facility”); OPA sec. 2704(20) 
(defining “natural resources” to include “such resources belonging to, managed by … or otherwise controlled 
by the United States), and sec. 2704(c)(3) (barring damages limitations for an “OCS facility or vessel”). OPA’s 
non-admiralty roots also appear in the statute’s indifference to “uniformity,” as this admiralty concept is 
venerated in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1918, an opinion B1 Bundle cites alongside 
Knickerbocker Ice. Co v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920), as “still retain[ing] ‘vitality.’” 808 S. F. Supp. 2d at 954 
n. 7 (citations omitted). Accord: Robert Peltz, The Myth of Uniformity in Maritime Law, supra note 100, at p. 
126. OPA authorizes the application of the differing laws of all states experiencing tortious impacts from 
single oil discharge incident within their waters, see OPA sec. 2718(a); of federal non-admiralty statute law 
pursuant to OPA/OCSLA; and, if B1 Bundle’s non-displacement position is correct, of the general maritime law 
that often conflicts with OPA. “Admiralty uniformity” in such a setting is a phantasm. The species of  
“uniformity” that is appropriate in the B1 Bundle context occurs on the federal plane alone in relation to OPA’s 
status as a “single uniform federal law,” see authority cited note 62 supra, which necessarily excludes general 
maritime law’s supposed status as an additional federal law track. 
134 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986).  
135 395 U.S. 352 (1969).   
136 470 U.S. 414 (1985). 
137 See Costonis I, note 16 supra at 523-24. 
138Outer Continental Shelf: Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83rd Cong. 
668 (1953) (statement of Richard Young, Esq., Member of the New York State Bar).   
139 395 U.S. 352, 365 n. 12 (1969) 
140 Id. at 365 n.12 (1969).  
141 Id. at 363.  
142 470 U.S. 414, 421 (1985). 
143 Id. at 422.  
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that “exploration and development of the Continental Shelf are not themselves maritime 
commerce.”144 
 
Executive Jet endorses in more contemporary form Justice Holmes’ demystifying 
recognition a half century earlier that admiralty law is not a “corpus juris,” but rather a 
“very limited body of customs and ordinances of the sea.”145 The opinion frowns on 
admiralty law’s governance of matters that are “only fortuitously and incidentally 
connected to navigable waters and … [bear] no relationship to traditional maritime 
activities.”146 It applauds admiralty law’s governance of matters that the latter is competent 
to address on the basis of its accumulated expertise and experience. Hence, its observation 
that  
 
through long experience, the law of the sea knows how to determine whether a particular ship is 
seaworthy, and it knows the nature of maintenance and cure. It is concerned with maritime liens, the 
general average, capture and prizes, limitation of liability, cargo damage and claims for salvage.”147 
 
 In a subsequent iteration of the “substantial relation” test, the Court commented that 
justification for admiralty law’s application exists if “a tortfeasor's activity, commercial or 
noncommercial, on navigable waters is so closely related to activity traditionally subject to 
admiralty law that the reasons for applying special admiralty rules would apply in the suit at 
hand.”148 
 
 Executive Jet’s point, like that of this essay overall, is straightforward and quite obvious.  
Core rationality calls for choosing the tool that not only is the most fit for the task at hand, 
but, as Part II illuminates, that squarely aligns with the Court’s displacement law and 
policy.  
 
II. Displacement: Congress, the Supreme Court and the Lower Federal Courts 
 
Reading the B1 Bundle opinion is akin to arriving at a theater during the second act of a 
three-act play, and observing what the actors are doing without quite understanding why. 
B1 Bundle’s conclusions on displacement are transparent enough, but how are we to 
understand OPA’s being left in the wings when Congress blasted through a two-decade 
stalemate to award OPA the starring role? The present section seeks to reconstruct the 
missing “first act” by stepping back from the opinion’s conclusions to survey prior issues of 
displacement jurisprudence and policy that frame the original choices available for this 
play’s narrative.   
 
                                                        
144 Id. at 425. Despite the Fifth Circuit’s former resistance, see Costonis II, supra note 16 at 15-20, it now 
acknowledges that “under Supreme Court precedent, offshore drilling is not maritime activity.”  OCS drilling is 
not “maritime commerce.” See Hercules Offshore, Inc. v. Barker, No. 12-20150 at p.10 (E.D. La. 2013) 
(refusing to remand to state court action for injury to worker atop OCS jack-up rig). 
145 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 235 (Holmes J., dissenting). 
146 Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 273. 
147 Id. at 270.  
148 Id. at 539-40 (1995) (emphasis added). 
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Four tasks await Part II.  Employing the concepts of “silence” and “speaking directly” to a 
“question” as the discussion’s prompts, the first establishes guidelines addressing various 
dimensions of the displacement lexicon.  The second brings greater precision to the 
manner in which the Supreme Court identifies and gauges overlap or cohabitation of the 
same “space” by a federal statute and its paired common law rule. The third highlights the 
threat to separation of powers values that these overlapping norms often pose. The last 
attends to the differing roles of the judge when acting as an autonomous lawmaker, on the 
one hand, and as an agent of the legislature filling interstitial gaps, on the other.   
 
The displacement lexicon’s key terms include “silence;” “comprehensive;” statutory 
“scope;” “speaking directly“ to a “matter,” “question,” or “subject;” “fields,” whether “entire” 
or otherwise, being “occupied;” “judicial lawmaking” and “interstitial gap filling” or, in 
Justice Holmes’ memorable phrase, “molar and molecular motions”;”149 and, finally, the 
statutory “windows,” wide or narrow, through which maritime law seeks passage and 
cohabitation with its paired statute. Dispersed throughout displacement decisions like the 
shards of a window’s broken glass, these terms challenge the following paragraphs to 
discern and give order to what on closer examination is the inherent sense of their 
seemingly random use. 
 
A. SILENCE  
 
1. DUELING CANONS  
 
Silence, it has been observed, “may be interpreted in a number of ways …. Silence may 
indicate that the question never occurred to Congress at all, or it may reflect mere 
oversight …, or it may demonstrate deliberate obscurity to avoid controversy that might 
defeat the passage of a bill.”150 B1 Bundle interprets OPA’s four silences151 as approval of 
matters not expressly negated, observing as to the punitive damages silence that “Congress 
knows how to proscribe punitive damages when it intends to.”152 Of course, one might as 
easily embrace the opposite outcome, taking refuge in the sonorous Latin of expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius. 
 
In one of his best-known forays into legal realism, Carl Llewellyn demonstrated that, by 
themselves, such canons are simply another way of stating a conclusion, not of credibly 
establishing or proving one. In line with Llewellyn’s exercise of “dueling canons,”153 but 
limiting it to two examples only, consider the following pairings: 
 
For non-displacement of prior law: “Congress thus demonstrated that it was capable 
of pre-empting a particular area when it chose to do so.”154  
                                                        
149 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
150 In re Tug Allie-B, Inc., 114 F. Supp.2d 1301, 1304 (M.D.Fla. 2000), quoting Rogers v.  
Frito-Lay, Inc. 611 F.2d 1074, 1085 (5th Cir. 1980). 
151 See TAN supra notes 31-34. 
152 B1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 962.  
153 Carl Llewellyn, The Common Law method: Deciding Appeals supra note 38, at Appendix C. 
154 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S., at 340, n.11 (Blackmun J., dissenting).  
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For displacement of prior law: “It is obvious that if Congress believed punitive 
damages necessary to eliminate discrimination in employment based on age, it 
knew exactly how to provide for them.”155 
 
For non-displacement of prior law: “Statutes which invade the common law or the 
general maritime law are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of 
long- established and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the 
contrary is evident.”156 
For displacement of prior law: “In the absence of strong indicia of a contrary 
Congressional intent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress provided 
precisely the remedy it considered appropriate.”157 
 
F. Scott Fitzgerald offers us an exit from the futility of starting, rather than ending a 
displacement inquiry with such canons: “Begin with an individual, and before you know it 
you find that you have created a type; begin with a type, and you find that you have 
created--nothing.”158 The canon is a “type”; the particular dispute is the “individual.” Only 
when the canon is tethered to and deeply informed by the dispute does the canon qualify as 
a guide for plausibly decoding statutory silence. But to begin with the canon –the “type”-- is 
to create “--nothing.” 
2. “Speaking Directly”  
 B1 Bundle mistakenly construes the Supreme Court’s “speak[ing] directly” condition to 
require, again, that Congress must expressly proscribe prior federal common or maritime 
law. But “speaking directly” requires instead that Congress address in a manner 
incompatible with the prior judge-made law the same question or matter spoken to by that 
law. Hence, the Court’s quotation in Milwaukee II from its prior admiralty decision in Mobil 
Oil Corporation v. Higginbotham: the issue is not “whether Congress had affirmatively 
proscribed the use of federal common law,” but instead “whether the legislative scheme 
‘spoke directly’ to [the] question.”159 
Higginbotham held that the Fifth Circuit overstepped its admiralty lawmaking bounds 
by approving loss of society damages under a maritime law wrongful death track when, 
under DHOSA, Congress permitted only pecuniary damages. DHOSA, the Court reasoned, 
                                                        
155 Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co, 559 F. 2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1978), en banc reh’g denied, 564 F.2d 97 (5th 
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 US 1066 (197). 
156 Isbrandsten Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952). 
157 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Assn, 453 U.S. 1, 145 (1981).  
158 F. Scott Fitzgerald, Rich Boy (Red Book Jan./Feb. 1926). 
159 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 315, quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 625 (emphasis added). 
The Court likewise does not require express statutory language to establish the statutory creation of a 
remedy. Hence, the Court’s statement that “[i]t is unnecessary to discuss at length the principles set out in 
recent decisions considering the question whether Congress intended to create a private action under a 
federal statute without saying so explicitly. The key to the inquiry is the intent of Congress.“ Middlesex 
County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Assn., 543 U.S. at 13. Accord: Transamerica Mortgage Advisors 
Inc., v. Lewis 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979). 
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spoke incompatibly to the same question that the maritime law tort addressed: the 
elements appropriate for inclusion in a wrongful death award. But DHOSA contains no 
language making express proscription a condition precedent to a displacement outcome. 
That is, DHOSA does not state that a “maritime law remedy, whether enacted prior to or 
following DHOSA’s enactment, that fails to respect section 30303’s ‘pecuniary’ limitation is 
hereby displaced.” This is the sense in which DHOSA is “silent” on the issue. The outcome 
was the work of the Court, which, sensitive to Congress’s lawmaking priority under 
separation of powers principles, declared that the statutory/maritime law difference by 
itself was sufficiently indicative of Congress’s intent to justify the Court’s ruling.   
This analysis undergirds the Court’s subsequent Milwaukee II declaration that “the 
question whether a previously available federal common-law action has been displaced by 
federal statutory law involves an assessment of the scope of the legislation and whether the 
scheme established by Congress addresses the problem formerly governed by federal 
common law.”160 “Scope” and “scheme” are not themselves express Congressional 
directives requiring displacement. Rather, they are intermediate elements that support this 
outcome despite the “silence” created by the absence of an express Congressional demand 
for displacement.   
Milwaukee II and Higginbotham’s three lessons for the OPA/B1 Bundle displacement 
inquiry are straightforward. First, B1 Bundle begs the question in its insistence that 
anything short of Congress’s express proscription of the maritime oil pollution tort or any 
of its components creates a “silence” which in and of itself saves the tort from 
displacement. Second, silence’s meaning can only be determined by disciplined scrutiny of 
OPA’s background, goals and language undertaken with a full appreciation of the thumb-
on-the-scale impact of the separation of powers values at stake. Third, express repudiation 
certainly affords one route to displacement, but it is hardly the only route. In fact, the 
“speaking directly” condition itself is but one of various alternatives for implementing the 
Court’s overall interpretative standard of “tak[ing] … the whole statute … and the objects 
and policy of the law, as indicated by its various provisions, and giv[ing] to it such a 
construction as will carry into execution the will of the Legislature …..” 161 
                                                        
160 Id. at 315 (emphasis added). In a setting closer to the Macondo scenario, United States v. Oswego Barge Co, 
664 F.2d 3237 (2d Cir. 1981), defines the “question” posed by the FWPCA oil pollution tort, OPA’s 
predecessor, in its statement that “ the FWPCA legislates on the subject of recovery by the United States on its 
costs of cleaning up oil spilled on American waters. Section 1321(f) establishes a comprehensive scheme of 
providing for both strict liability up to specific limits and recovery of full costs upon proof of willful 
negligence or willful misconduct with the privity and knowledge of the owner.” Id. at 339-40. Adjusting for 
OPA‘s greater detail and its addition of the private action for property and economic loss, the FWPCA 
definition of the “question” is an apt model for OPA as itself occupying a subfield akin to that of the FWPCA’s 
section 1321(f). Gabarick handles the task more modestly because the “space” it focuses upon –duplication by 
maritime law of OPA’s “covered damages”—is more modest. Hence, Gabarick’s declaration that “OPA defines 
its scope explicitly through its statutory text. It defines what damages are covered and the process for 
pursuing a claim, and allows suit in federal court should that process be unsuccessful.” Gabarick v. Laurin 
Maritime (America) Inc. 623 F. Supp. 2d 741, 748.  (E.D. La. 2009) 
161 Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974), quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 194 (1857).   
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B. Gauging the Statutory/General Maritime Law Overlap 
The spatial imagery common to the displacement lexicon calls to mind a two-circle Venn 
Diagram that plots the space occupied by the federal statute and the general maritime rule, 
and maps their area of overlap. The federal statute’s dimensions are measured by the 
familiar terms  “comprehensive;” “scope;” “field (“entire” or otherwise); “window;” and 
“matter,” “subject” or “question.” Each of the last three terms serves the common function 
of locating a subfield or even a single “point” at which the statute and maritime rule 
converge, rather than a statutory “field” so expansive or “entire” that it necessarily 
subsumes the likely more limited space claimed by the maritime rule.  
 
Appreciating the variability of boundary-setting for the “question” is essential because 
the latter may present itself as narrowly as Higginbotham’s “loss of society” damages in a 
wrongful death action,162 or as broadly as the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
responsibility to insure the health of the nation’s waters163 or to abate carbon dioxide 
emissions into the atmosphere.164 If the “question” is narrow, a statute speaks directly to it 
simply by naming the topic or its equivalent, as witness Higginbotham’s restricted focus on 
DHOSA’s reference to “pecuniary damages.”  
 
Setting the boundaries of the “question” is more demanding when the latter engages an 
entire field as in the foregoing abatement of carbon dioxide emissions or the pollution of 
the nation’s waters examples. The task commences with confirming that the question at 
hand is indeed the federal statute’s subject. Then, following Milwaukee II’s language above, 
further confirmation is necessary that the legislative scope and scheme, as the pertinent act 
defines both, engage the same “matter” or “question” as that targeted by the judge-made 
rule.165  
 
1. “Windows”: A Bar to the Maritime Tort as a Parallel Track to OPA 
 
“Windows” in a federal statute offer salvation for maritime rules only if the lawmaking 
rules can “fit” through them in order to take up residence alongside the statute. As Judge 
Newman portrays the metaphor in United States v. Owego Barge Corporation,166  
 
[i]n determining whether statutes leave room for judge-made law, courts sometimes confront a narrow 
‘window.’ Judge-made law may be fashioned when Congress has provided ‘enough federal law’ so that a 
legislative purpose is clear, … but not when Congress has provided so much federal law that its detail or 
comprehensiveness would be undermined by common law supplements.167 
    
                                                        
162 See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978). 
163 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
164 See American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) 
165 For an instance of a legislative scheme that failed to meet the test in text, see Oneida County v. Oneida 
Nation of New York State, 470 U.S. 226, 236-41(1995)(Non-Intercourse Acts did not “speak directly” to the 
elimination of a tribe’s federal common law right to bring possessory land actions).  
166 664 F.2d 327, 339 N. 15 (2d Cir. 1981).  
167 Id. at 339, n. 15 (citation omitted).  
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This image, which is spatially simple but conceptually subtle, appears to apply to  gap-
filling and to lawmaking. If the former, the image is of less interest here because the general 
maritime law tort exalted in B1 Bundle is indisputably a maritime lawmaking exercise.  
 
Oswego and Higginbotham advise that OPA leaves no or insufficient space through which 
the maritime tort can pass as it must to supplement OPA’s statutory tort. Oswego fixes the 
window’s lower and upper heights in its direction that Congress must provide “‘enough 
federal law’ so that a legislative purpose is clear,” but must avoid providing “so much 
federal law that its details or comprehensiveness would be undermined by common law 
supplements.” By these measures OPA lacks a window of requisite size because OPA not 
only addresses the same question as the maritime tort, but OPA’s “answer” overwhelms the 
latter’s “answer” in breadth and often incompatible detail.168   
 
Higginbotham’s phrasing differs somewhat from Oswego’s, but its meaning is more 
pointed still for this essay’s purpose:  
 
There is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress' silence and rewriting rules that 
Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted. In the area covered by the statute, it would be no 
more appropriate to prescribe a different measure of damages than to prescribe a different statute of 
limitations, or a different class of beneficiaries.169 
 
One way to explore the implications of this language and its link to the windows 
 metaphor is to suppose that OPA preceded the attempt by lower federal court judges to 
establish the very maritime pollution tort under discussion. Would this post-OPA judicial 
lawmaking exercise survive the objection that Congress has “provided ‘enough federal law’ 
so that a legislative purpose is clear”?   The hypothetical is the stuff of fantasy, of course. I 
find it difficult to believe that, post-OPA, the lower federal courts would attempt to stitch 
the threadbare maritime tort over OPA’s elaborate tapestry, or that the Supreme Court 
would hesitate to declare the tort displaced if they did.  
 
2. “Comprehensiveness“:  The Spatial Continuum and Its Increments   
  
“Comprehensive,” the workhorse of the lexicon, deserves its own category in light of the 
frequency of its use and the variety of meanings assigned to it. In countless decisions it 
merely describes a statute of substantial breadth or detail.170 Alternatively, it may be used 
neutrally in this sense, but the opinion that employs it may nonetheless categorize the 
pertinent statute as occupying essentially an entire field.171 Or it may be used to justify a 
                                                        
168 See note 110 supra. 
169 See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 665 (1978). 
170 B1 Bundle would appear to fall within this category in view of its acknowledgements both that “OPA is a 
comprehensive statute addressing responsibility for oil spills, including … liability for  … economic damages 
incurred by private parties…,” B1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 959, and that the senate report characterized 
OPA as a “single federal law  providing … liability for oil pollution.” Id.  A non-displacement ruling in the face 
of what would appear to be extraordinary concessions to the contrary evidences the iron grip of the  
opinion’s silence canon and to problematic claims favoring the precedential value of the two non-OPA 
precedents reviewed in Part III(B) infra.   
171 See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981).     
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displacement conclusion on its own footing despite acknowledgement that the statute 
occupies less than an entire field.172  
 
 The root offense posed by the comprehensiveness objection is that the maritime 
rule trespasses upon the legislative powers vested in Congress by article I, section. Behind 
the trespass, the Supreme Court reminds us in Milwaukee II, lies the issue of “which branch 
of the Federal Government is the source of federal law.”173 Obviously, a judge-made rule the 
content of which openly conflicts with a statute would not survive displacement. But this is 
because conflict affords the most brazen instance of judicial trespass. Outright conflict, of 
which there is a great deal in the OPA/maritime rule pairing, is only one form of  
incompatibility.  Milwaukee II’s language warrants opposition to a variety of forms of 
judicial lawmaking that derogate from Congress’s primacy in addition to blatant 
inconsistency or conflict.  
 
 The term “comprehensive,” like the foregoing terms “windows” and “question” (to 
which a statute “speaks directly”), engages various incremental points along a single 
continuum, rather than isolated elements, each with its own axis. The capacity for 
displacement exists, therefore, whether a statute occupies an entire field or a subfield, if 
you wish, or is viewed as “speaking directly” to some specific remedial component. The 
purpose at hand is to determine Congress’s intent, not to make a fetish of one or more of 
these labels as B1 Bundle does by exiling OPA to a non-displacement no-mans-land 
somewhere between “occupation of an entire field” and “speaking directly” to some 
particular feature of the maritime tort.  
 
Moreover, the same statute or statutory element may occasionally target multiple points 
along the continuum, depending upon whether the inquiry’s target is the statute overall or 
one of its discrete elements. Milwaukee II, for example, describes the FWPCA both as 
                                                        
172 This usage is routine in opinions favoring OPA’s preemption of the maritime tort, which reason that OPA 
doesn’t cover the entire field because it excludes such additional concerns as personal injury, death or vessel 
collisions. See, e.g. Gabarick v. Laurin Maritime (America) Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 741, 745-46, 748 (E.D. La. 
2009); Nat’l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Moran Mid-Atlantic Corp., 924 F. Supp. 1436, 1447, 1450 (E.D. Va. 
(1996), aff’d sub nom Nat’l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Moran Trade Corp. of Delaware, 997 WL 560047 
(4th Cir. 1997). I prefer a different view of the matter by defining the space, subfield or field on the basis of 
what Congress intended the statute to cover. Because no statute covers everything, a test that requires that it 
do so as a condition of occupying a field can never be met. The proper question is whether the statute 
exhausts all pertinent points of the field or subfield Congress selected for its attention. From this perspective, 
the OPA private statutory tort, which exhaustively establishes a remedial regime for private economic and 
private losses attendant upon tortious oil discharges, is not rendered less comprehensive because it does not 
cover other matters, e.g., personal injury, death or collision, that Congress never intended for it to cover. For 
the view that within the range of its intended coverage, OPA is arguably even more comprehensive than pre-
OPA sec. 311 of the FWPCA as to particular elements. See TAN 177-79  infra. 
173 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 319, n. 14. 
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occupying its entire field174 and as speaking directly to the question addressed by the 
displaced common law rule.175  
 
Consider the alternative configurations of OPA that are in play in B1 Bundle in light of 
this continuum. If OPA’s section 2702(b) “covered damages” is the target, it makes perfect 
sense for Gabarick to describe OPA as “speaking directly” to this discrete component on the 
same basis that Higginbotham described DHOSA section 30303 as “speaking directly” to 
“pecuniary damages.” If the continuum is accessed at its uppermost point --occupation of 
an “entire field”-- B1 Bundle correctly excludes OPA because, unlike the FWPCA, for 
example, OPA limits its coverage to a single pollutant.176   
 
But OPA also accesses the continuum at the “subfield” level in a space earlier defined as 
liability and compensation for private economic and property losses occasioned by seaborne 
petroleum discharges. This subfield, which precisely duplicates the content of the B1 
Bundle-certified claims litigated in the eponymous proceeding, is amply occupied by OPA 
section 2702 and its associates.177 Gabarick rightfully emphasizes that the language of 
sections 2702(a), 2702(b) 2713(a) and various associated provisions is categorical and 
mandatory.  
 
Depending upon the element chosen for comparison, moreover, OPA is either more or as 
inclusive as the FWPCA within OPA’s subfield.  OPA’s categories of economic and property 
injuries go well beyond FWPCA’s narrow focus on governmental cleanup cost recovery. 
OPA radically oversteps the latter, moreover, by embracing the private claimants and 
private remedies. OPA aggressively proscribes virtually any actual or threatened private 
petroleum discharge, NO while the FWPCA allows discharge, by permit, of a broad range of 
pollutants.178 OPA and the FWPCA join together, however in their vast geographic range: 
their respective writs run to the nation’s inland waters, the OCS’s living and non-living 
resources, ocean waters out to 200 miles offshore, and all discharges into or along navigable 
waters, adjoining shorelines, and even the ambient air above both.
179
 It is unlikely that there are 




                                                        
174 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S., at 317 (The FWPCA creates “an all encompassing program of water pollution 
regulation”).  
175 Id. at 313. (Applying the Higginbotham “speaking directly” standard to the FWPCA). Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) likewise appears to conflate the “occupation of an entire field” with “speaking 
directly” displacement gauges. See id. at 489.  
176 B1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 961 (E.D. La. 2011).  
177 See note 110 supra for a partial inventory of these provisions.  
178 See Michael Healy, Still Dirty after Twenty–Five Years: Water Quality Standards Enforcement and the 
Availability of Citizen Suits, 24 Ecol. L.Q. 393 (1997). 
179 See Sen. Rep. No. 101-94 at p. 11, 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 733. Among the various reasons why OPA is  
premised in part, and OCSLA, in whole, on Congress’s non-admiralty constitutional powers is their application 
to the OCS, which effectively constitutes United States public lands, and to the airsheds above the waters 
superadjacent to the OCS.  Control of ambient air quality above OCS facilities is prescribed by OCSLA sec. 
1344(a)(8). 
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C. Congress and the Federal Judiciary as “Lawmakers”  
 
 In the absence of a constraining statute, the admiralty clause’s grant of jurisdiction 
elevates general maritime law over other forms of federal common lawmaking in 
displacement disputes.180 Under appropriate circumstances, the authority may afford a 
“narrow exception to the limited lawmaking role of the federal judiciary ….,” the Supreme 
Court declared in Northwest Airlines, “because [w]e consistently have interpreted the grant 
of general admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts as a proper basis for the development 
of judge-made rules of maritime law.”181 Nor can the resilience of at least some “long- 
established“ admiralty or general maritime principles be ignored.182 None are as venerated 
as rules pertaining to the welfare of seamen, the “wards of admiralty.”183 
 
But federal judges’ lawmaking powers are no match for those of Congress when their 
exercise threatens or breaches separation of powers boundaries. Northwest Airlines 
counsels, as also previously observed, that “[e[ven in admiralty… where the federal 
judiciary's lawmaking power may well be at its strongest, it is our duty to respect the will 
of Congress.”184 Delaval, of course, drives the nail home by assigning general maritime law 
dominance only “in the absence of a relevant statute.”185  
 Maritime law principles that Congress concludes no longer reflect the needs of the age, 
moreover, are not shielded from displacement simply by reason of their vintage. Otherwise, 
Congress would exceed its powers in displacing the federal government’s former maritime 
remedies by CWA section 311. The Robins rule and the 1851 Limited Liability Act, 
moreover, boast longevities of decades or over a century and a half, respectively. In the 
1990 OPA statute, however, Congress scuttled both,186 demonstrating that vintage alone 
hardly guarantees non-displacement, and may well preordain it. One might argue, however 
                                                        
180See Lines v. Haen Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 285 (1952); United States v. Oswego Barge 
Co., 664 F.2d 327, 642 (2d Cir. 1981); Henry Hart, Relations between State and Federal Law 54 Colum L. Rev. 
489 496-97 (1954).  
181 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77, 95-96 (1981). In 
United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 39 (1975), the Court approved the substitution of the general 
maritime law rule of proportional fault for the former maritime rule of divided damages, stating that “the 
Judiciary has traditionally taken the lead in formulating flexible and fair remedies in the law maritime, and 
‘Congress had largely left to this Court the responsibility for fashioning the controlling rules of admiralty 
law.’“ (citing Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 15, 20 (1963). Id. at 409.  
182 See Isbrandsten Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779 (1952) in which, the Court accompanied its ruling that a ship 
owners’ expenses could not be set off against a seaman’s wages and transportation allowance, with the 
observation that “[s]tatutes which invade the … the general maritime law [respecting maintenance and cure] 
are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except 
when a statutory purpose is evident.” Id. at 783. 
183The story is blessed with centuries of history as note 229, 232-34 infra.   
184 Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 96. 
185 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986). Accord: Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 24 (1990); Mobil Oil Corp. v. 
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 624-25. 
186 See OPA secs. 2702(b)(2)(E) (eliminating the Robins requirement that the claimant’s own property must 
be damaged) and sec. 2718(a) and (c) (immunizing state or federal liability additional to OPA liability from 
restriction by the Limited Liability Act).  B1 Bundle agrees that OPA itself supersedes the both elements, but 
only under the OPA track. See B1 Bundle, 808 f. Supp. 2d 943, 959. 
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improbably, that both survive OPA on their supposed maritime parallel track, but certainly 
not on the ground that Congress lacks power to displace or modify them simply because 
they pre-date OPA. What counts is not age, but Congress’s assessment of the former rule’s 
concordance with current values.187 This principle is amplified when, as under OPA section 
2751(e), Congress expressly excludes admiralty law’s governance of those OPA elements 
falling within the OPA section 2751(e)’s proviso as matters for which OPA “otherwise 
provides.” 
 
Pertinent to the discussion as well is the Court’s endorsement in appropriate instances 
of judicial lawmaking as a placeholder, terminable upon Congress’s later passage of 
legislation speaking to the same issue. Illustrative are the Court’s recurring portrayals of 
judicial lawmaking as a response to necessity or compulsion created by Congressional 
inaction,188 and its willingness, if not enthusiasm, to have the federal courts bow out as the 
Congressional Cavalry takes charge of the battle. Milwaukee II installs this theme as a staple 
of the Court’s displacement jurisprudence.  
 
We have always recognized that federal common law is subject to the paramount authority of 
Congress. It is resorted to in the absence of an applicable Act of Congress and because the Court is 
compelled to consider federal questions which cannot be answered from federal citations alone. 
Federal common law is a necessary expedient, and when Congress addresses a question previously 
governed by a decision rested on federal common law, the need for such an unusual exercise of 
lawmaking by federal courts disappears.189 
  
 These sentiments inform the modern Court’s understanding of the federal 
statute/general maritime rule pairing as well.190 Hence, Milwaukee II’s reliance on a prior 
admiralty decision, Higginbotham, to accord primacy to congressional lawmaking. 
Adverting to the unavailability of “legislative codes and statutes,”191 Higginbotham repeats 
that the absence of a “comprehensive maritime code” compels general maritime 
lawmaking.192 But it too insists that the rule formulated in this exercise must yield upon 
Congress’s adoption of a statute that “speaks directly” to the matter addressed by the 
maritime rule.193   
 
                                                        
187 As the principle was classically formulated by the Court, “[i]t cannot be supposed that the framers of the 
Constitution contemplated that the [admiralty] law should forever remain unalterable. Congress undoubtedly 
has authority under the commercial power, if no other, to introduce such changes as are likely to be needed.” 
The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall) 558, 577 (1875).   
188 See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 109 n. 9 (1972); D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 
447, 469 (1942) (Jackson J., concurring); cf. Committee for Consideration of Jones Fall Sewerage System v. 
Train, 539 F. 2d 1006, 1008 (4th Cir. 1976).   
189 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 313-14 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
190  Because the “Court has frequently stated that ‘Congress has largely left to this Court the responsibility for 
fashioning the controlling rules of admiralty law,’” Judge Sloviter has observed, the “absence of statutory 
law… [obligates] the Court … to make law, and it deems itself free to formulate flexible and fair remedies in 
the law maritime.” Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 257, 261 (C.A. Pa. 1980) (citations omitted) (Sloviter J., 
dissenting).  
191 D’Oench, Duhme, 315 U.S. at 470 (1975) (Jackson J, concurring) (federal common law’s necessity derives 
from the “recognized futility of attempting all-complete statutory codes….”).  
192Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 625.  
193 Id.  
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D. The Federal Judiciary’s Dual Roles: “Lawmaking” and “Interstitial Gap-Filling”  
 
 The distinction between judicial lawmaking and interstitial gap-filling is a staple of 
federal jurisprudence and the “new federal law.” “In almost any statutory scheme, there 
may be a need for judicial interpretation of ambiguous or incomplete provisions...” the 
Supreme Court observed in Northwest Airlines, “[b]ut the authority to construe a statute is 
fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a new rule or to provide a new 
remedy which Congress has decided not to adopt.”194 Elaborating upon Judge Friendly’s 
four-part division of federal common law modes,195 Judge Sloviter adds that “[t]he judicial 
task of establishing, formulating or discovering federal common law is qualitatively 
different from the judicial task of filling in the interstices of Congress’s acts.”196   
 
 Vulnerability to displacement increases when the common/maritime rule opposes a 
statute covering the same or greater territory. Here, judiciary as lawmaker takes on  
Congress as lawmaker, certainly an unpromising contest in which congressional consent is 
imperative for joint occupation of the same lawmaking space.197 It redirects the judicial 
inquiry from questions (and responses) appropriate for a judicial gap-filling exercise to 
those focused on judicial lawmaking’s propriety. Seconding Northwest Airlines within the 
FWPCA oil pollution remedy context, Judge Newman observes that “’[i]nterpreting’ a 
statute to determine its preemptive effect upon federal common law analytically differs 
from the task of determining the meaning of statutes in order to apply their often general 
terms to specific situations.”198  
 
 The degree of latitude allowed federal judges in performing the respective tasks differs 
in the two cases. Gap-filling leaves substantial play for judicial inventiveness both in 
framing and selecting among the choices open to it in fashioning a judicial patch for 
Congress’s incomplete draftsmanship. But the displacement inquiry does not countenance 
similar inventiveness. A detailed federal statute such as OPA that comprehensively 
occupies a subfield, or that has spoken directly to an issue addressed as well by a maritime 
rule should prevail in a displacement contest unless Congress has indicated otherwise.  
                                                        
194 Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 97. 
195 Judge Friendly’s modes describe the object achieved by judicial action as follows: “spontaneous generation 
as in the case of government contracts or interstate controversies,” “implication of a private federal cause of 
action from a statute providing other sanctions,” “construing a jurisdictional grant as a command to fashion 
federal law,” and “the normal filling of statutory interstices.”  In Praise of Erie –And of the New Federal 
Common Law, supra note 3 at 421.  
196 Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248, 259 (C.A. Penn. 1980) (Sloviter J., dissenting).   
197 Absent congressional blessing, the Court’s displacement conclusion may be expressed in various ways. In 
Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 94, for example, “it is … not within our competence as federal judges to amend 
these comprehensive enforcement schemes by adding to them another private remedy not authorized by 
Congress.” In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 625, “[t]here is a basic difference between filling a 
gap left by Congress and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted.” In 
Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 324, “[i]n imposing stricter effluent limitations, the District Court was not ‘filling a 
gap’ in the regulatory scheme, it was simply providing a different regulatory scheme.” The displaced maritime 
rule’s defect in each case is the rule’s occupation of space in a manner that the Supreme Court views as 
violating separation of powers boundaries. Common too is the appropriate judicial response: invalidating the 
lower court’s attempt to rewrite the statute under the guise of filling a gap within it.  
198 United States v. Oswego Barge Co., 664 F.2d at 339 n. 17 (1981).  
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The Court, therefore, discourages federal judges from confusing displacement 
adjudications with the entitlement to cure a statute’s perceived “deficiencies” by judicially 
decreeing what they believe is demanded by “common sense and the public weal.”199 In 
Higginbotham, for example, the Court cautioned that even if the judiciary could do a “better 
job” than Congress in formulating a wrongful death remedy, “we have no authority to 
substitute our views for those expressed by Congress in a duly enacted statute.”200 Having 
determined that the maritime rule is displaced, that is, the judicial task is at an end. 
 
E. Direct Claimant Actions against Third Party Defendants  
 
OPA is an exercise of Congress’s lawmaking power. Its “primary goal” has been 
described as “delivering expanded compensation quickly to victims without requiring them 
to suffer the law’s delay while the courts sorted out who was responsible.”201 “The ‘heart of 
OPA 90 is the concept of a ‘responsible party,”202 moreover, “who would have to pay for 
everything regardless of fault, but then could re-allocate ultimate responsibility by contract 
and contribution actions.”203 
 
Pre-B1 Bundle OPA jurisprudence endorsed this model, which aligns claimants 
directly with responsible parties as the source of full compensation for their 
property/economic loss. United States v. M/V Cosco Busan204 declares that “[t]he animating 
principle of OPA is to permit injured parties to seek damages and cleanup costs directly 
from the responsible party.”205 Gabarick reaffirms the exclusive claimant/responsible party 
pairing in its holding that “[c]laimants should pursue claims covered under OPA only 
against responsible parties and in accord with the procedures established by OPA. Then, 
the responsible party can take action against third parties.” 206 
 
                                                        
199 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978) 
200 Id. at 626. Accord: Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 324 (“The question is whether the field has been occupied, not 
whether it has been occupied in a particular manner”). 
201  E. Donald Elliott, Primer, supra note 86 at 2.  
202 Id. at 5. 
203 Id at 4.  OPA follows Superfund in subjecting responsible parties to “status liability,” a concept --foreign to 
the world of maritime negligence torts-- that obligates these parties, whether or not liable for a discharge’s 
response costs and damages, to compensate claimants for their damages, and then seek recourse against 
liable third party defendants. See note 124 for the concept’s application in a context in which the non-
negligent responsible party has become a claimant itself, but is prevented by OPA’s damages limitation 
regime from recovering from the negligent party its entire payout to the government and other claimants. 
Status liability renders direct claimant actions against non-responsible parties redundant; in fact, OPA section 
2713(a) insists that “all claims for …  damages shall be presented …  to the responsible party.” One dimension 
of this essay’s thesis favoring displacement links directly to OPA’s provisions for direct claimant access to 
responsible parties, principally sec. 2713(a)’s universal (“all claims”) and mandatory  (shall be presented)  
language as riveted to sec. 2702(a)’s similarly categorical syntax  “Notwithstanding any other provision or rule 
of law”) (emphasis added).  
204 557 F. Supp.2d 1058 (N.D. Ca. 2008). 
205 United States v. M/V Cosco Busan, 557 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1060 (N.D. Ca. 2008).  
206 Gabarick v. Laurin Maritime (America) Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 741, 750 (E.D. 2009). 
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B1 Bundle disagrees, and insists upon the maritime law entitlement of claimants 
directly to sue third parties because “there is nothing in OPA to indicate that Congress 
intended “ otherwise.207 B1 Bundle’s rote response is unfortunate because the question  
merits thoughtful attention by admiralty advocates. Weighing this response against OPA 
section 2713’s rationale and mandatory language, OPA’s “subfield occupation” of pollution 
remedies,208 and the clash of the OPA and maritime damages limitations requirements, 209 
however, it would seem clear that displacement is measurably the more plausible outcome.  
 
Is approving direct claims against third parties merely filling an interstitial gap, or, 
instead, aggressive judicial lawmaking. If the first, B1 Bundle enjoys significant latitude in 
resolving Congress’s incomplete draftsmanship. If the second, the court does not, even if it 
could do a “better job” than Congress, Higginbotham reminds us, because federal courts 
have “no authority to substitute [their] views for those expressed by Congress in a duly 
enacted statute.”  The considerations enumerated in the preceding paragraph favor the 
conclusion that B1 Bundle has “provid[ed] a different regulatory regime” rather than “filling 
a gap.”210  
 
F. The Admiralty Savings Clause and Displacement Avoidance 
 
Judicial lawmaking that trespasses on Congress’s lawmaking prerogative may avoid 
displacement if Congress chooses to accept the incursion. Let us assume that this essay’s 
displacement thesis offers the more plausible outcome, and inquire whether OPA’s section 
2751(e) ”211 “saves” the maritime tort from displacement.  
 
The view offered here is that case for non-displacement is severely challenged by the 
section’s proviso,“[e]xcept as otherwise provided,” and in fact would have been stronger 
without section 2751(e). The proviso’s plain meaning is clear, and hence conclusive as to 
Congress’s intent on this ground alone.  As phrased, moreover, the clause strikingly 
duplicates the Court’s core displacement jurisprudence norm. Further, its legislative 
history reveals Congress’s choice to disassociate section 2751(e) from section 2718(a), the 
state law savings clause. Without any proviso or qualification,212 this section exemplifies a 
“savings” clause primed to shield state measures controlling discharges within state waters 
from preemption by OPA. But the House’s preference for a steel-encased admiralty savings 
clause was stymied in conference.213 By the conferees’ addition of the language “except as 
otherwise provided,”214 they converted section 2751(e) from a rival of the state law savings 
                                                        
207 B1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 962 (E.D. La. 2011). 
208 See supra Part II(B)(2).  
209 See supra Part I(c). 
210 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981).  
211 OPA sec. 2751(e) provides in material part that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Act, this Act does 
not affect … admiralty and maritime law; or … the [admiralty] jurisdiction of the district courts of the United 
States….” 
212 OPA sec. 2718(a) provides that “[n]othing in this Act … shall – (1) affect or …be interpreted as preempting 
the authority of any State …. from imposing any additional liability or requirement with respect to – (a) the 
discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such state….” 
213 See H.R. Conf. Rep. 101-653 at 159; reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.A.N.  779, 837. 
214 Id. 
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clause into a statutory clone of Delaval’s elevation of “relevant” federal statutes over 
general maritime law.215 
 
The opening clauses of Delaval and section 2751(e) are provisos that affirm the priority 
of, or “save,” if you will, federal statutory law from the main clause’s bounding of the area in 
which general maritime or admiralty law reigns supreme. Yet no one speaks of Delaval as 
harboring an “admiralty savings clause.” Its pronouncement is understood instead as a 
two-clause statement that secures federal statutory priority over general maritime law 
with respect to those matters either withdrawn from or denied to the latter by the 
legislative authority constitutionally vested in Congress.  
 
The two-part syntax of section 2751(e) is no different despite its faux label. Indeed, the 
section might with greater reason be deemed an “admiralty displacing clause” insofar as it 
overrides far more (if not all) of the maritime economic and property loss remedy than it 
“saves.” The key to this conclusion is the term “otherwise,” which in common parlance and 
as defined in the most respected of multi-volume dictionaries signifies “in another way” or 
“in a different manner.”216 What section 2751(e) says and means, therefore, is that 
admiralty law is “saved” from displacement only to the extent that OPA fails to “provide” 
for the resolution of remedial issues “in another way” or “in a different manner” than that 
employed by the maritime tort. 
 
This outcome precisely follows the course engraved in the Supreme Court’s core 
displacement jurisprudence. The proviso restates in statutory form the Court’s 
constitutionally derived commitment to safeguard legislative primacy. The Court does so 
by displacing common law/maritime rules that address the same question (or seek to 
occupy the same space) by answering the question or filling the space “in a different 
manner” or “in another way” than the statute. OPA displaces the private maritime tort 
because OPA’s answer, as exhaustively detailed in this essay, is indisputably “otherwise” 
than that “provided” by maritime law. If interpreted in accordance with OPA’s clearly 
defined objectives and purposes, its answers with respect to the various subjects surveyed 
in this essay are at variance with those endorsed by the maritime remedy.  
 
The “ answer” of these and other OPA provisions also tweak more nuanced forms of 
difference.  Illustrative are the addition or subtraction of content from the maritime rule to 
address a perceived inadequacy,217 the adoption, as mandatory, of requirements that 
admiralty treats as permissive,218 and the specification of multiple statutes of limitations 
                                                        
215 Delaval states that “[a]bsent a relevant statute, the general maritime law, as developed by the judiciary, 
applies,” 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986). 
216 The Oxford Dictionary 984 (2d ed. 1989) assigns as the primary meanings of the adverb “otherwise” the 
following: “in another way, in other ways, in a different manner, or by other means, differently.” Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 1598 (1986) assigns to the adverb 
”otherwise” the primary meanings  “in a different way or manner; differently.”  
217 See OPA sec. 2703(a) limiting the responsible party’s defenses to three only: Act of God, of war, or of 
exclusive commission by a sole fault third party not in a contractual relationship with the responsible party.   
218 See OPA section 2716(f) mandating the direct liability of insurers (guarantors) of responsible parties to 
private claimants. 
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aligned with the procedural and substantive elements uniquely woven into the OPA-
defined maritime tort.219 Respecting the diverseness of difference secures the separation of 
powers value celebrated in Milwaukee II that “it is for Congress, not federal courts to 
articulate the appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of federal law.”220  
 
Section 2753(e)’s legislative history witnessed the transformation of the section to its 
present version from its earlier mating in the House version with section 2718((a)’s 
unqualified state law savings clause.221 As initially presented in the House bill, the section 
read: “This Act does not affect … admiralty or maritime law, or …[admiralty 
jurisdiction].”222 The conference committee understood the House provision’s purpose as 
clarifying that it “does not supersede [admiralty] law, nor does it change the jurisdiction of 
the District Courts….”223 This understanding places the House provision in parallel with 
OPA’s state law savings provision, which is similarly free of an “except as otherwise 
provided in this Act” proviso. The Senate bill was mute on the issue. But the conference 
committee resolved the difference between the two bills by a conference substitute that 
accepted the House version only “with an amendment clarifying that the provision was 
subject to the provisions of the substitute.”224 The committee’s action effaced the two 





Maritime Punitive Damages: Townsend, Baker and Category Errors 
 
 Consideration of maritime punitive damages’ post-OPA survival completes the nine 
topics listed in this essay’s introduction. The issue brings front and center B1 Bundle’s use 
of Atlantic Sounding Company v. Townsend225 and Exxon Shipping Company v. Baker226 to 
justify its claims that maritime punitive damages as well as the maritime tort overall 
survive OPA’s enactment. The present discussion adopts as its evaluative standard 
                                                        
219 See OPA secs. 2717(f)(1)(a)-(4) (establishing  limitations periods for the commencement of actions for 
damages, removal costs, contribution and subrogation, respectively).  
220 Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981). 
221 This history is detailed in H.R. Conf. Rep. 101-653, at p. 159; reprinted in 1990 U.S.CC.A.N., at p. 838. 
222 H.R. Conf. Rep., at 160; 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 839.  
223 Id. 557 U.S. 404 (2009). 
224 The conferees also stated that “[t]here is no change in current law unless there is a specific provision to 
the contrary,” id., a statement that, in one unlikely interpretation, translates into the requirement that absent 
express proscription, as exemplified in OPA sec. 2718(a)’s discard of the Limited Liability Act, OPA leaves 
maritime law unscathed. This translation harks back to B1 Bundle’s discredited canon that failure expressly to 
bar maritime law necessarily safeguards its survival. As Part II(A) explains, OPA provisions incompatible with 
the maritime tort qualify as “specific provisions to the contrary” even if they are not expressly tagged as such.    
As well, the position runs directly counter to the plain meaning of the sec. 2751(a) term “otherwise.” Nor is 
the claim credible that a single sentence of OPA’s voluminous legislative history offsets the principal tenets of 
Supreme Court displacement jurisprudence or of Congress’s understanding of the inadequacies of the 
maritime tort and its aggressive reinvention of the latter within OPA itself.     
225 557 U.S. 404 (2009). 
226 554 US. 471 (2008).  
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Townsend’s assault on category errors, a phrase used here to refer to factual or legal 
discrepancies between a putative precedent and its paired later opinion. 
 
B1 Bundle’s thesis that maritime law affords a parallel track to OPA derives  
ultimately from two rationales: the opinion’s silence canon and its claim that Townsend and 
Baker sustain maritime punitive damages specifically and substantive general maritime 
law overall.  Objections to the silence canon needn’t be reiterated here. The objection to 
summoning Townsend/Baker to B1 Bundle’s side is straightforward: the effort is no less 
vulnerable to category errors than was the use of Miles to avoid the Townsend outcome.     
 
A. Atlantic Sounding Company v. Townsend  
 
 Townsend employed the rationale to reject an employer’s motion to strike a seaman’s 
maritime claims for maintenance and cure and punitive damages. The employer had 
invoked Miles v. Apex Marine Corporation227 to support its claim that the Jones Act 
precluded the award of punitive damages in the Townsend maintenance and cure action.228   
The Court denied Miles’s governance of the issue because “Miles does not address either 
maintenance and cure actions in general or the availability of punitive damages for such 
actions. The decision instead grapples with the entirely different question whether general 
maritime law should provide a cause of action for wrongful death based on 
unseaworthiness.”229 Nor was it helpful for the Townsend employer that “[u]nlike the 
situation presented in Miles, both the general maritime cause of action (maintenance and 
cure) and the remedy (punitive damages) were well established before the passage of the 
Jones Act…. Also unlike the facts presented by Miles, the Jones Act does not address 
maintenance and cure or its remedy.”230 
 
 Consistent with Townsend’s demand for precise situational equivalence, a three-point 
point comparison of Townsend and B1 Bundle and a following broader distinction between 
seamen’s welfare and maritime pollution actions illuminate several of B1 Bundle’s 
transparent category errors. First, Townsend stresses that maritime maintenance and 
punitive damages enjoy elevated status as long-established doctrines because they date 
back two centuries or more.231 The maritime pollution tort, in contrast, was still seeking 
                                                        
227 498 U.S. 19 (1990) 
228 Miles was similarly cabined by the Ninth Circuit in its decision in Baker below that the CWA did not 
displace maritime punitive damages rules. To Exxon’s assertion that Miles justified a contrary conclusion, the 
court distinguished Miles as a seaman’s wrongful death case, not a maritime pollution tort case, in which the 
parties, legal theories, remedies, history and injuries are not comparable. The court understood, as B1 Bundle 
chose to ignore, that these two categories of actions address entirely different dimensions of the admiralty 
arc. See TAN 243-246 infra. The appellate court viewed Miles’ cause of action as one “based on the long and 
technical history of wrongful death actions, and the traditional restrictions of wrongful death remedies in 
Lord Campbells’ Act. True, the Congressional limitations were held [in Miles] to prevent an inference of broader 
remedies in the general maritime law, but the tort was the specialized and traditionally limited one of wrongful 
death.” In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3rd 1215, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001). 
229 Townsend, 557 U.S. at 419. 
230 Id. at 420. 
231 Id. at 409-14. 
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definitive shape as late as the 1960’s.232 Second, punitive damages and maintenance and 
cure are as venerated as they are ancient233; judicial nurturance of maintenance and cure, 
in fact, derives from the courts’ centuries-long solicitude for the welfare of seamen as the 
special wards of the admiralty.234  Not so with the maritime pollution tort, whose 
inadequacies, as detailed throughout Parts I and II, convinced Congress of the necessity for 
its radical transformation.      
 
 Finally, the Jones Act expressly creates parallel statutory and general maritime 
remedial tracks by granting seaman claimants a section 30304 election to proceed under 
either track.235 In fact, the Court acknowledges that the Jones Act “has done no more than 
supplement the remedy of maintenance and cure for injuries suffered by the seaman.”236 
By this point in the essay, readers will have drawn their own conclusions concerning the 
aptness of dismissing OPA as “no more than [a] supplement” to the maritime pollution tort. 
What may be useful to add, however, is a comparison of the savings clauses of the Jones Act 
and OPA.  Jones Act section 30404 expressly grants the foregoing election and its parallel 
track. OPA section 2751(e)’s proviso, on the other hand, expressly denies it for matters for 
which OPA “otherwise provide[s].” Gliding from the former to the latter while ignoring a  
difference of this magnitude would not have been celebrated by the Townsend bench.  
 
The error of B1 Bundle’s reliance on Townsend is aggravated by the non-equivalence of 
seamen welfare actions and the oil pollution tort disputes.237  These two opinions sets are 
as different as chalk and cheese. Townsend itself models most of the components of the first 
category. It features the claimed tension between the Jones Act and the maritime remedy of 
maintenance and cure with a punitive damages add-on. Other seaman-based actions 
include maritime unseaworthiness or wrongful death rules, on the one side, and DHOSA, 
independent of or in conjunction with the Jones Act, on the other. If the issue turns on 
federal/state preemption rather than statute/maritime law displacement, federal 
legislation disappears from the mix. The claimants, of course, are seamen (or their 
representatives), whose claims are predicated on damages for physical injury, death, or 
some other threat to their health or employment status.   
  
The B1 Bundle tort offers an entirely different format in its federal statutory foundation, 
claimants, injury, and associated relief. The tort pairs not with the Jones Act or DHOSA, but 
with two federal environmental statutes, one of which pervasively overhauls the maritime 
tort and bars an admiralty bloodline for those of its provisions that address the question of 
                                                        
232 See cases and authorities cited n. 100 supra. 
233 Townsend, 557 U.S. at 409-14. 
234 Id. at  417. Justice Story justified the action in 1823 on humanitarian and economic grounds in the 
following terms: “If some provision be not made for [seamen] in sickness at the expense of the ship, they must 
often in foreign ports suffer the accumulated evils of disease, and poverty, and sometimes perish from the 
want of suitable nourishment….” Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480 (No. 6,047) (CC Me. 1823).  
235 Id. at 416. Sec. 30304 of the Jones Act provides that an injured seaman or his personal representative upon 
the former’s death “may elect to bring a civil action at law … against the employer ….” (emphasis 
added).Accord: Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Lines, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1932).  
236 O’Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dry Dock., 318 U.S. 36, 43 (1928) (emphasis added). 
237 For a detailed discussion of the distortions resulting from the conflation of the two types of actions, see 
Costonis I, note 16 supra, at 519-21; Costonis II, note 16 supra, at 5-13.  
 41 
remedies in a manner “otherwise” than the maritime tort.238 Its claimants are not seamen 
seeking aid as wards of admiralty through writs formulated centuries ago,239 but some 
100,000 private entities, overwhelmingly dry-landers, grouped together exclusively on the 
basis of having suffered “private or ‘non-governmental economic loss and property 
damages.’”240 B1 Bundle’s frictionless traffic between these two jarringly dissimilar formats 
speaks volumes about the admiralty gene’s voracious appetite, expressed in B1 Bundle by 
its unyielding marginalization of OPA.   
 
 Moving beyond these differences, B1 Bundle and Townsend both seek maritime 
punitive damages, and both feature maritime rules adopted prior to the statutes claimed to 
have displaced them. Discussion of the former issue is taken up in the Baker/B1 Bundle 
subsection immediately below. Addressed here is the maritime tort’s priority in time, 
which, when credited as indiscriminately as it is in B1 Bundle, further evidences the gene’s 
dynastic bent.   
 
Channeling Delavan, Townsend makes perfectly clear that the maritime maintenance 
and cure and punitive damages rules remain effective “unless Congress has enacted 
legislation departing from this common-law understanding.”241 No jurisprudential Thetis, 
however, has dipped the maritime tort in the River Styx to shield it from legislative 
violence. The question turns instead on whether or not the passion garnered for seamen’s 
welfare enlivens Congress’s assessment of the maritime pollution tort as well.  OPA’s flight 
from, rather than embrace of the latter surely settles this question.    
 
B. Exxon Shipping Company v. Baker  
 
 Aided by the silence canon, the admiralty gene also had its way in B1 Bundle’s 
equally facile traffic with Baker. B1 Bundle invoked Baker’s holding that the CWA does not 
displace maritime punitive damages242 to reason that OPA too leaves these damages in 
place.243 B1 Bundle’s reliance on Baker creates its own category errors, however. Several  
unbridgeable differences divide the Baker/CWA and B1 Bundle/OPA pairings, as do the 
conflicts in the respective statutory and maritime law damages limitation regimes. 
 
 Taking the last-named topic first, earlier discussion244 established two fundamental 
points. First, conflicts between these damages limitations requirements call for OPA’s 
displacement of maritime law remedies. The two regimes’ treatment of liability standards, 
                                                        
238 See TAN 66-68, 211-16 supra. 
239 Seamen employees (or their representatives) of responsible parties have brought personal injury and 
death actions against responsible parties, but the latter are not encompassed within OPA, which under 
section 2702(a) and as employed in B1 Bundle, extends solely to non-governmental economic and property 
losses attendant upon the oil discharges targeted by the section.    
240 B1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 947 (E.D. La. 2011). 
241 Townsend, 557 U.S., at 415 (emphasis added). Although worded differently, Townsend’s “unless clause” 
carries the same substantive import as Delevan’s “[a]bsent” a relevant statute,” and OPA sec. 2751(e)’s 
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided.” See TAN  66-68, 211-16 supra. 
242 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 488-89 (2008). 
243 B1 Bundle, 808 F.Supp. 2d at 960, 962.  
244 See Part I(C). 
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levels of damage, and types of damage openly clash with one another.245 Second, Baker 
does not offer B1 Bundle a way out of this conflict. Baker’s statute, CWA section 311, 
excludes private parties from its benefits and, more important for comparison purposes, 
from its restrictions. Key among the latter is the statute’s damages limitations regime, 
which would have displaced general maritime law remedies if private parties, such as the 
Baker plaintiffs, had been covered by the statute.246 Baker properly concluded, therefore, 
that the Court had no basis for “perceiv[ing]that punitive damages for private harms will 
have any frustrating effect on the CWA remedial scheme, which would point to 
preemption.”247  
 
B1 Bundle’s assertions that the “imposition of punitive damages under general 
maritime law would not circumvent OPA’s limitation of liability,”248 nor “frustrate the OPA 
liability scheme,”249 are difficult to honor. Added to the foregoing considerations is an 
impediment specific to the punitive damages category itself. OPA addresses compensatory 
damages alone.250 B1 Bundle asserts, however, that “the behavior that would give rise to 
punitive damages under general maritime law –gross negligence—would also break OPA’s 
limit of liability.”251 What B1 Bundle fails to say is that these observations camoflauge still 
another conflict: under OPA’s damages limitation regime, the damages due upon breaking 
its cap would be compensatory damages, not punitive damages as under maritime law. The 
quoted language also carries the implication that the OPA/maritime tort policies are so 
well integrated that courts needn’t attend any longer to Congress’s struggle to balance 
OPA’s victim-relief values with its damages limitation values.252 South Port Marine’s harsh 
dismissal253 of an OPA interpretation this liberal is considered presently.  
 
A second category error dividing Baker and B1 Bundle arises in consequence of the 
interplay of two savings clauses: OPA section 2751(e) and CWA section 1321(o)(1). The 
former, as is now familiar, preserves only general maritime rules not “otherwise provided” 
for in OPA. The latter provides that  “[n]othing in this section shall affect … in any way the 
obligations of any owner or operator … to any person… under any provision of law for 
damages to any  …  privately owned property resulting from a discharge….”254 Rivals to a 
savings clause this unqualified are Jones Act section 30304 and OPA section 2718(a), both 
of which this essay has singled out as antonyms to OPA’s admiralty savings clause.  
Predictably, the Court spurned Exxon’s bid to recast CWA section 1321(0(1) as a harbinger 
of OPA section 2751(e).255  
 
                                                        
245 See TAN 121-24 supra.  
246 See TAN 125-33 supra. 
247 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 489 (2008). 
248 B1 Bundle 808 F. Supp. 2d, at 962 
249 Id.  
250 See note 131 supra. 
251 B1 Bundle, 808 F.2d. at 962 (E.D. La. 2011) 
252 See TAN supra at 114-19, 129-33. 
253 See TAN 263 infra.  
254 CWA sec. 1321(0)(1) (emphasis added).  
255See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 488-89 (2008). 
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Likewise assymetrical in the Baker/B1 Bundle pairing is a missing step in the ladder 
that must be climbed to reach punitive damages: namely, a cause of action for 
compensatory damages upon which the punitive damages count is –and must be—
predicated. OPA, of course, excludes punitive damages from its own remedial palette by 
expressly restricting its damages-related provisions to compensatory damages alone. 256 
Exxon assisted Baker‘s clamaints up the first step when it stipulated to its liability for 
negligence and attendant compensatory damages prior to the Court’s consideration of the 
punitive damages issue.257 But the entire run of pre-B1 Bundle OPA cases holding that 
maritime damages are displaced by OPA section 2702(b)’s “covered damages”258 saw off 
the limb upon which maritime punitive damages are poised. “Punitive damages … do not 
constitute a separate cause of action, but instead form a remedy available for some tortious 
or otherwise unlawful acts,”259 South Port Marine advises. “Consequently, plaintiff's claim 
for punitive damages must relate to some separate cause of action which permits recovery 
of punitive damages.”260  
 
The final consideration is less a category error than a critique of B1 Bundle’s choice 
to ignore Part I(C)’s implications concerning both the balance Congress struck in devising 
OPA’s damages limitation regime and the unanimity of judicial support for the balance’s 
role in securing displacement of maritime tort remedies.261 Among B1 Bundle’s least 
satisfactory dimensions is the improbability of its claim that OPA’s remedial scheme, 
inclusive of its damages limitation regime, does not “frustrate the OPA liability scheme.”262   
 
 I believe that South Port Marine got it right in its response to the plaintiff’s petition 
for a broadly liberal interpretation of OPA that would leave maritime punitive damages in 
place. “While we agree that such intentions were Congress's principal motivation in 
enacting the OPA,” the court replied 
 
we think it would be naive to adopt so simpleminded a view of congressional policymaking in light of the 
competing interests addressed by the Act. For instance, the OPA imposes strict liability for oil discharges, 
provides both civil and criminal penalties for violations of the statute, and even removes the traditional 
limitation of liability in cases of gross negligence or willful conduct. Yet at the same time, the Act 
preserves the liability caps in most cases and declines to impose punitive damages. We think that the OPA 
embodies Congress's attempt to balance the various concerns at issue, and trust that the resolution of 
these difficult policy questions is better suited to the political mechanisms of the legislature than to our 
deliberative process.263 
 
                                                        
256 See note 131 supra. Baker itself acknowledges that “the consensus today is that punitives are aimed not at 
compensation but principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.” Baker, 554 U.S. at 419.  
257 Baker, 554 U.S. at 479. 
258 See cases cited Part I(A)(1) supra. 
259 South Port Marine LLC, 234 F.3rd at 64. 
260 Id. B1 Bundle does not address this contention presumably because of its holding that general maritime 
law affords a parallel track (and hence the first step of the ladder). 
261 See cases cited note 115 (CWA sec. 311 displacement of maritime law); South Port Marine LLC, 243 F.3rd 
58 (1st Cir. 2000) (OPA displacement of maritime law); Clausen v. M/V New Carissa, 171 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Or. 
2001) (same).  
262 B1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp 2d at 962. 
263 South Port Marine, 234 F.3rd at 66. 
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Among the further burdens imposed on responsible parties by OPA or OPA-related 
legislation is OPA’s elimination of the Robins Doctrine264, a change that vastly inflates BP’s 
financial obligations to B1 Bundle’s 100,000-plus claimants, other private claimants and a 
host of federal and state agencies.  As to the latter, moreover, OPA also endorses such 
additional categories of public agency damages as natural resource loss or degradation265; 
losses associated with foregone taxes, royalties, rents or fees266; and increases in the cost of 
public services during or after removal activities.267 Lying in wait for responsible parties 
outside of OPA are a range of increased civil penalties, the most draconian of which would 
allow per barrel penalties of as much as $4300.268 Estimates of a total release from the 
Macondo well of 4.9 million barrels suggest a maximum civil penalty in the range of $20 
billion. Congress has left to the courts the discretion, however, to consider such factors as 
the “seriousness of the violation,” “the degree of culpability,” and “any other matters as 
justice may require” as among the lead criteria for the penalty’s calculation.269  
 
Perhaps even Llewellyn would agree that the basis has properly been laid in this essay 
for a canon, updated to take account of OPA’s passage, that elegantly sums up why 
maritime punitive damages should be displaced, and, more broadly, why OPA’s pivotal 
silences should be interpreted to support the displacement of the maritime tort remedy 
overall.    
 
Once Congress legislates comprehensively on the subject of remedies for oil spill 
cleanup costs [and damages], the responsibility lies with Congress to spell out 
expressly what, if any, role remains for courts to fashion and apply non-statutory 
remedies.270 
 
Having chosen not to spell out a role for general maritime law, Congress’s silence speaks 
volumes. 
 
                                                        
264 See OPA sec. 2702(b)(2)(E). 
265 See OPA sec. 2702(b)(2)(A). 
266 See OPA sec. 2702(b)(2) (D). 
267 See OPA sec. 2702(b)(2)(F) 
268 See CWA 1321(b)(7)(A), as modified by 40 C.F.R. sec. 19.4 (2010). 
269 See CWA, sec. 1321(b)(7)(F) (8).  
270 United States v. Oswego Barge Co., 664 F.2d 327, 341 (2d Cir. 1981).  
